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Family firms are replete with problems concerning family and business issues but
they remain the most dominant form of business worldwide. Decisions about strategy,
structure, and goals of the firm play an integral part in the distinction of family firms
from non-family firms (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005) and these decisions are further
complicated in the family firm by the interaction of the family and business systems
(Stafford, Duncan, Danes & Winter, 1999). Sharma (2000) and Chrisman and colleagues
(2005) call for research of this interaction through the utilization of stakeholder theory
because family firms involve a specific array of stakeholders with different stakes and
different levels of salience. This dissertation further investigates the interaction of the
family and the business in a new and interesting way. This will be the first attempt to
investigate the way stakeholders and their salience affects the goals and performance of
family firms.
The dissertation developed below focuses on the differences that exist among the
salience of stakeholders in the family firm. I first develop theory-based hypotheses on a
variety of relationships within the family and family firm that will contribute to a better

understanding of the behavior of family firms. Second, I describe the research
methodology and sample design to be utilized to test the developed hypotheses. I expect
my results to not only empirically validate my research questions but to also provide
practical and useful information for future research in this area.
The aim of this study is to contribute to knowledge by empirically testing a
framework for stakeholder salience in the family firm as well as assessing how the
salience of particular groups affect the performance of family firms.
Key words: Family, Family Firm, Stakeholder Theory, Stakeholder Salience, Decision
Making
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Organizational scholars conduct research to understand multiple issues
surrounding the creation, inter-workings, environment, and eventual decline of
businesses. A recent development within in the field of management attempts to identify
and understand the management of stakeholders by a firm, where a stakeholder is “any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s
objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 25). Since the publication of Freeman’s (1984) seminal
book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, a large number of articles on this
emerging theory have been published and professionals worldwide have taken notice of
and implemented ideas from this concept (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). As reported by
Donaldson and Preston (1995), 12 books using the stakeholder concept had been
published by 1995 and by 1999 over 170 articles were published in this area (Griffin,
1999). From that time, the field continued to develop theoretically (e.g., Donaldson &
Preston, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Galbreath, 2006; Jones, 1995;
Jones & Wicks, 1999; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Neville & Menguc, 2006;
Reynolds, Schultz & Hekman, 2006; Stavrou, Kassinis & Filotheou, 2007; Vilanova,
2007) but empirical testing of key elements of the theory is limited (Freeman, 1999;
Gioia, 1999) and therefore more work needs to be done.
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Grouping stakeholders into functional categories to provide an understanding of
their varying influences on firm activities has consumed much time and effort in the
development of stakeholder theory (Rowley, 1997). Unfortunately, scholars have given
little attention to a major group of individuals that make up a distinct segment of many
firms, the family (Sharma, 2001). Not only does the prevalence of family firms support
their inclusion in stakeholder management research (e.g., Astrachan & Shanker, 2003),
but their distinctiveness from non-family firms warrants further investigation (Sharma,
2004). Family firms differ from non-family firms in numerous ways, but perhaps most
importantly is the complex web of relationships derived from the interactions of the
family and business systems (Olson, Zuiker, Danes, Stafford, Heck & Duncan, 2003). As
described by Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg (1997), the overlapping nature of
the family with the business deserves much attention because it is this overlap that gives
the family business its distinction. Decisions concerning strategy, structure, and goals are
further complicated when made in the confines of a family business (Sharma, 2001)
because the influential family stakeholder group often wishes to pursue non-economic
goals along with typical economic business goals (Barnett, Pearson, Chrisman & Chua,
2008; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2003a; Stafford et al., 1999). This complication also plays
an integral part in the distinction of family firms from non-family firms (Chrisman, Chua,
& Sharma, 2005). Thus, the introduction of the family, along with its different goals and
stakes, justifies further investigation due to the theoretical gap it creates in the
development of a stakeholder theory of the firm (Chrisman et al., 2005).
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) developed a model which attempts to show how
the salience of various stakeholder groups, based upon power, legitimacy, and urgency,
2

affects CEO decision making. Agle and colleagues (1999) furthered this model by
including the values of CEOs as a moderating variable between stakeholder attributes and
CEO decisions. These authors also tested and supported their new model. Moving
stakeholder theory in this direction is an important development because previous work
has not been able to provide a systematic way to understand the differing levels of
influence that stakeholders may have on firm processes. As in prior stakeholder research,
these authors do not consider the influence of the family which may be critical because
family firms involve a specific array of stakeholders with different stakes and different
levels of influence (Sharma, 2001). The intent of the following is to rectify this omission.
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, a conceptual model is
developed to analyze how stakeholder groups differ from one another in family firms.
This model differs from the one Agle et al. (1999) tested by showing that economic and
non-economic stakes of the primary internal stakeholder groups play a significant role in
the decision processes in family firms due to their high level of salience. Non-economic
stakes are pursued in non-family businesses but stakeholder groups that push for the
accomplishment of these types of goals tend to be farther removed from the firm or are
lower level employees in the organization and therefore do not have as much influence on
the firm. The new model will also be significantly different because it will show that
stakes have a direct relationship and the stakeholder model will be specifically developed
with family firms in mind. Previously, stakes were not included in the model and only
the relationship between performance and salience was tested. Agle et al. (1999) were
unable to show a significant relationship between stakeholder salience and performance.
This dissertation argues that this is because salience will moderate the relationship
3

between different stakeholders’ stakes and performance. In other words, when certain
stakeholders are highly salient, their claims will be met and it is the differences in these
claims that will affect performance.
Second, hypotheses derived from the conceptual model will be empirically tested.
To conduct this empirical analysis, the study will utilize a survey instrument developed
herein. The survey instrument will be distributed to family firm CEOs in an attempt to
understand more completely how these CEOs view the salience of stakeholder groups in
their family firms. The following sections of this chapter will provide brief reviews of
stakeholder theory and family firm research, specify and describe the major research
questions to be analyzed, and conclude with a description of the steps taken to complete
this dissertation.

Stakeholder Theory
Even though the popularity of stakeholder theory has grown in recent years,
authors continue to disagree on some of the most basic elements of this descriptive
assessment of organizational activities (Mitchell et al., 1997). Before moving forward it
is important to begin by detailing on what scholars do agree. The first and most
rudimentary assumption of stakeholder theory is that corporations have a multitude of
relationships with groups of individuals who are affected by and can affect decisions
made by the firm (Freeman, 1984). These individuals are called stakeholders. Second,
stakeholder theory’s concern lies with the makeup of the relationships between the firm
and stakeholders and how these relationships affect processes and outcomes for these
parties (Jones & Wicks, 1999). Third, stakeholder theory disregards the emphasis of
4

adhering only to the wants and demands of shareholders (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson &
Preston, 1995) and assumes that all stakeholders have an inherent worth that should be
considered during managerial decision making. Finally, as alluded to in the third
assumption above, stakeholder theory contains a descriptive characteristic that
concentrates on the process of managerial decision making (Donaldson & Preston, 1995;
Jones & Wicks, 1999). Thus, from these assumptions, it can be said that managers in a
firm must recognize that various stakeholder groups exist that can affect or are affected
by the actions of the firm; these stakeholders can withhold participation with the firm
which may reduce efficiency and profitability; and firms that effectively manage
stakeholder interests have the potential to enjoy a competitive advantage over other firms
(Hillman & Keim, 2001).
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) reviewed the literature concerning the
identification of stakeholder groups and proposed a new and interesting way to
understand the process managers undergo. Their stakeholder identification process
suggests that managerial perceptions of three stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy,
and urgency – may affect the salience of stakeholders, where salience is “the degree to
which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims” (Agle et al., 1999, p.
507). Indeed, the combination of the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, the
legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm, and the urgency of the
stakeholder’s claims on the firm will affect the decisions made by managers depending
on how salient the managers perceive these attributes to be. This is a change in direction
for stakeholder theory because it supplements efforts by others to simplify the
stakeholder concept through classification schemes. By clarifying how stakeholder
5

groups become salient in the eyes of managers, it in turn is clearer how stakeholders can
affect firm decision-making. Mitchell et al.’s (1997) argument presupposes that it is
critical to stakeholder theory to understand that only when the manager perceives an
identified stakeholder group to be salient will their needs be met.
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) salience theory is helpful because disagreement continues
on many issues surrounding stakeholder theory, such as “who are the stakeholders of the
firm?” This most basic question can be difficult to answer considering the broad nature
of the definition of stakeholders first proposed by Freeman (1984). By looking at
stakeholders as any person or entity who can affect of is affected by the actions of the
organization, research has been limited in the ability to rule out virtually any group or
individual as a stakeholder. Although Freeman’s definition continues to be utilized in the
literature, many other definitions of stakeholders have been provided in an attempt to
narrow the field to a manageable level (Mitchell et al., 1997). Common themes amongst
the relatively narrow views of what constitutes a stakeholder include identifying
stakeholders based on their significance to the firm’s core capabilities, their economic
and moral interests, and survival. For example, Clarkson (1995) describes stakeholders
in terms of risk, be it involuntary (the firm can affect stakeholders regardless of affiliation
with the firm), or voluntary (stakeholders who purposefully put themselves in harms way
through such activities as employment, investment, etc.) Describing stakeholders in this
way effectively reduces those who can be stakeholders of a firm to only individuals or
entities that can lose or gain something (a stake) (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskissson (2007) further divide stakeholder groups into three
categories: capital market stakeholders, product market stakeholders, and organizational
6

stakeholders. Capital market stakeholders include all stakeholder groups that have a
financial stake in the company, e.g., shareholders and banks. Product market
stakeholders include all stakeholder groups that are not members of the organization,
have not invested financially in the organization, but can still be affected by the firm.
These groups include host communities, environmental groups, suppliers, customers, etc.
Finally, organizational stakeholders are those individuals who actually work for the
organization. Classifications of this type are helpful in understanding who makes up
stakeholder groups and more importantly what types of stakes or interests they have in
the firm. This is essential because the interests of the different stakeholder groups often
conflict. For example, capital market stakeholders have invested financially in the firm
and expect a return on their investment commensurate with the level of risk they have
assumed. On the other hand, product market stakeholders, such as customers, expect to
receive quality goods at a fair price. This leaves managers of firms in situations where
they must weigh the interests of each group and decide what course of action to take.

Family Firm Research
Interest in family firm research has increased substantially over the last 3 decades
(Sharma, 2004). The aim of this research has been to define family business and identify
differences between family firms and non-family firms which have performance
implications. Research has not been limited merely to descriptions of the characteristics
of the family firm or the unique interactions of families within firms. The research in this
field has moved forward with sound theory, which describes how the interactions in
family firms transpire and what results these interactions have on firm performance.
7

A dominant issue in family firm research is adequately explaining why family
firms are different from non-family firms. To move the field forward, comparisons of
both family with non-family businesses and comparisons among different types of family
businesses is necessary. In both cases, an attempt is made to understand how the family
and the business interact with each other and how this affects the performance and
sustainability of the firm. To accomplish this task, main stream management theories
such as the resource based view (e.g., Habbershon & Williams, 1999), agency and
stewardship theories (e. g., Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001), institutional
theory (Lansberg, 1983), etc. have been utilized. Underlying each of these theoretical
explanations, though, is the belief that there are several systems at work that affect these
firms in such a way as to make them unique.
Initially, the work of Hollander (1983) influenced authors to look at family firms
as two systems, the family and the business. Although very applicable and intuitively
appealing, a further refinement of this model by Taguiri and Davis (1982) and Lansberg
(1988) suggested that there were actually three systems, called the three-circle model,
interacting in the family firm – family, management, and ownership – and these systems
are surrounded by the general environment. Each system possesses individual norms,
values, goals, and structures but an individual may often play roles in the systems
concurrently. Since each system has its own distinct set of attributes and characteristics,
conflicts may arise during decision making processes. This model makes it easier to
identify the different stakeholders in a family firm and if used effectively, the three-circle
model can help scholars explain role and interpersonal conflicts, goal incongruence
between systems, priority development in family firms, financial expectations, etc.
8

(Gersick, Davis, Hampton & Lansberg, 1997). The three-circle model also helps explain
behaviors in different types of family firms.
The importance of this illustration of the family firm for this dissertation derives
from the overlap of interests by members of the family firm who may at anytime be a part
of one or all three of the different systems. By being obligated to adhere to the interests
of several competing systems, family firm CEOs and/or management have a much more
complex process to undertake when making decisions. For example, family members
may be inclined to offer other family members jobs in the business regardless of their
capabilities (Gersick et al., 1997). On the other hand, managers in the firm may instead
want to only hire individuals who possess the skills and abilities necessary to complete
work effectively. Thus, describing the stakes for each of the systems in the family firm
may help to demonstrate more of these conflicts along with how decisions being made
affect firm performance.
As can be seen in the preceding example, the three-circle model is a helpful
heuristic for scholars to utilize to understand the multiple and complex relationships
found in the family firm. As noted previously, family business research has not received
much attention from stakeholder theorists. However, stakeholder theory may prove
beneficial to understanding several issues in the family business literature, including, but
not limited to, how stakeholders in family firms view economic and non-economic goals
(Sharma, 2004). It may be important to find out how family members in family firms
define success, because a lack of alignment in their definitions of success may lead to
conflict (Astrachan & McMillan, 2003; Sharma, 2004). Examples of these types of goals
include a basic standard of living, providing jobs for future family members, etc.
9

Conversely, stakeholder theory could benefit from the inclusion of the family as a
stakeholder group because the duality of roles played by the family firm CEO who is
often entrenched within several stakeholder groups could affect decision making
processes. This has yet to be systematically studied in stakeholder literature.
In summary, there is potential to bring together stakeholder management concepts
and literature from family firm research to answer questions regarding both economic and
non-economic performance in family firms. Also, through this analysis it is possible to
further enhance our understanding of the affect of salience on decision making when the
decision maker holds positions in several stakeholder groups. Thus, answering the
following research questions may be a means to further both stakeholder theory and
family firm research.

Research Questions
Based on the purpose of this dissertation, the following research questions will be
investigated in family firms:
(1)

How do stakes of primary stakeholders in family firms influence economic
performance?

(2)

How does the salience of stakeholders in family firms moderate the
relationship between stakes and economic performance?

(3)

How do stakes of primary stakeholders in family firms influence noneconomic performance?

(4)

How does the salience of stakeholders in family firms moderate the
relationship between stakes and non-economic performance?
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To answers to these research questions, it is essential to distinguish the primary
stakeholders of the family firm. By doing this, the dissertation will focus on the most
influential individuals in the firm. This is important because their level of influence is
expected to affect decision makers of the firm. The three-circle model will be utilized to
meet this end. It is also important to describe the different stakes that are held by each of
the primary stakeholder groups in the family firm. Since stakes of different groups
appear in many instances to conflict with those of other groups, it is necessary to know
which groups have which stakes. It is also important to know what stakes are held in
high regard by each of the groups because different stakes may affect performance in
different ways.
By discussing stakes at length it will be possible to create survey items to assess
how different stakes directly affect both economic and non-economic performance.
Thus, answering questions one and three shows that adhering to the stakes of the primary
stakeholder groups in family firms affects the performance of such firm. The testing of
non-economic performance is central to this dissertation because it is argued that family
firms are not satisfied solely with economic performance, but instead consider the
performance of the family as essential to their survival.
Finally, testing questions 2 and 4 extends the ideas set forth by Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) and Agle and colleagues (1999) which first describe and later test the
idea that the level of salience of a group in a firm will affect firm performance.
Questions 2 and 4 alter the relationships described by these authors in that they
investigate the effect of salience indirectly through the stakes possessed by each
stakeholder group. Also, similar to the third research question, question 4 will indirectly
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test the relationship of salience with a non-economic performance measure in the family
firm. Therefore, the findings of research questions 2 and 4 will provide critical
information for both stakeholder and family firm theorists.

Contributions
The dissertation aims to make several contributions to the literature concerning
stakeholder theory and family firms.
First, the simultaneous review of stakeholder and family firm literature adds to the
work in this area and intends to provide future scholars the tools necessary to develop
further studies which assess stakeholder relationships in family firms. Donaldson and
Preston’s (1995) call for limiting the study of stakeholders to professionalized, publicly
held corporations lacks the scope necessary to build a complete stakeholder theory of the
firm. Hence, the perspective of Campbell (1997) said it best that research without the
family as a stakeholder group is inconsistent with the main tenets of stakeholder theory.
Thus, this dissertation will answer the call to research in the area of stakeholders and
family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005; Sharma, 2004).
As noted previously, family firm research has been assessed on the basis of
several leading theories in the social sciences. The omission of stakeholder theory in this
growing body of literature may be detrimental because insight from the study of the
family as stakeholders can provide valuable information to these other theories. For
example, Chrisman and colleagues (2005, p. 569) contend that by expounding upon the
relationships of stakeholders in family firms scholars may be better equipped to
understand the gap left by agency theory and the resource based view by explaining how
12

“formulating organizational goals and strategies cause resources to be acquired and
agency costs to be eliminated or amplified.” The results of the dissertation proposed
herein will be a step toward these types of explanations.
Second, this research will further develop the model described by Mitchell and
colleagues (1995) and later tested by Agle et al. (1999) they found few significant results
based on their operationalization of the constructs. Specifically, they found no
significant, direct relationships between salience and performance and this was their main
theoretical argument in their work. Agle et al. (1999) call for future research concerning
the effects of salience on performance due to this result. By hypothesizing an indirect
relationship between stakeholder salience and performance through the stakes of
stakeholder groups, this dissertation may be able to better explain how the influence of
stakeholder groups affects firms. Therefore this dissertation may provide missing
variables and enhanced conceptualizations of stakeholder relationships to remedy the
situation.
Finally, by including the family stakeholder group and non-economic
performance measures, this study will not only add to the stakeholder literature but will
also further develop the ideas in family firm literature. Understanding how the inclusion
of the family stakeholder group can alter relationships between stakes and different types
of performance may lead to better descriptions of the family firm. Also, by including
different types of family firms in this research, insight may be provided as to why some
family firms are able to survive and prosper and others are not.
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Organization of the Study
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter I consists of an
introduction to stakeholder and family firm research, including definitions of the main
constructs from which to study. This is followed by the purpose of the proposed study
and the research questions based on past research conducted within these literature
streams. The contributions of the study to the literature will follow and the introduction
will conclude with a general discussion of the organization of the study.
Chapter II comprises the literature review, model, and hypotheses. First, a
literature review discusses stakeholder theory and its development over the last few
decades. A full review of the seminal work by Freeman (1984) and its effect on the
development of the field will be offered. Also, this review of literature places particular
emphasis on the work of Mitchell et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999), which is due to the
extensions to their model that this dissertation intends to present. Then, a discussion
about family firms and their dynamic decision-making processes follows. This review of
literature will place emphasis on the overlap of the family, ownership and business
systems. Third, a conceptual model and a set of hypotheses are developed based on the
integration of these literature streams.
Chapter III describes the methodology of the study. First, the research design, the
unit of analysis and the sources of data are discussed. Second, the sampling frame and the
power of the study are discussed. Third, issues of validity in using previous and creating
new scales will be illustrated. Fourth, the measures used in the study are described.
These are grouped into dependent, independent, moderating, and control variables. Next,
the data analytic techniques used to test new scales for construct, convergent, and
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discriminant validity are explained. Finally, upon creation of all scales, data analytic
techniques to test the relationships put forth in chapter two will be described in detail.
Chapter IV presents the analysis of the data collected for the study as it is
presented in Chapter III. The analysis includes the results of the hypotheses’ testing as
well as the discussion of research findings.
Chapter V summarizes the research conducted in this study. The chapter includes
the theoretical and empirical limitation of the study as well as the contributions to the
literature. Finally, the chapter concludes with implications for academic research and
practice, and recommendations to consider in future research to advance on the study of
stakeholders and family firms.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW, MODEL, AND HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this chapter is to present a literature review that explains the
theoretical underpinnings of the conceptual model to be tested in this dissertation. The
conceptual model is primarily derived from the writings of Mitchell and colleagues
(1997) and from Agle et al. (1999). This chapter reviews stakeholder theory, stakeholder
salience, and family firm research and shows that the conflicting needs of the family and
business cause the decision making process of top management to be affected in a
number of ways. A new model of stakeholder salience in the family firm is introduced
and hypotheses are derived from this model. The most important conceptual contribution
of this dissertation is the inclusion of stakes along with stakeholder salience in the study
of family firms. The chapter is divided into several sections. First, the major
underpinnings of stakeholder theory are reviewed. Most importantly, stakeholder
identification and stakeholder salience are discussed in turn to fully underscore the
processes by which managers make decisions when multiple stakeholders are considered.
Second, family firm research is reviewed paying close attention to the interactions
of families with the firm when making firm decisions. The three circle model of the
family firm (Gersick et al., 1997) is introduced and later used as a framework to
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describe the different stakes possessed by each stakeholder group in the family firm.
This review also includes the most common goals sought by family firms, be it economic
or non-economic. One of the most prominent theories utilized in family firm research,
agency theory, is introduced in the literature review in an attempt to show that gaps in
this literature stream continue to exist. These gaps are outlined and discussed throughout.
Next, the proposed model is introduced in a very general sense. This entails a
brief discussion of the changes in relationships made to Agle et al.’s (1999) model and
why these changes are warranted. Finally, the proposed model is discussed in a more
specific manner by outlining hypotheses which are to be tested in subsequent chapters.

The Development of Stakeholder Theory
A fundamental question in organizational research has often undertaken the task
of describing why do firms exist and what are their major functions (Coase, 1937). Also
important, is what determines their scale and scope? One answer to this question is that
firms exist to create value in different forms – value for those who have invested in the
business (Smith, 1895), value for the compensation of employees, value for customers
(Slater, 1997), etc. Increasingly, the modern company must be able to adhere to the
interests of and create value for an assortment of groups and individuals so as to operate
effectively (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Since the interests of these groups and individuals
often conflict, it may be difficult to comprehend how and why managers make the
decisions that they do. In turn, the factors determining the scale and scope of these firms
are misunderstood and very difficult to interpret.
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Stakeholder theory offers insight on this complex and confusing set of
circumstances within the firm. Although Edward Freeman (1984) is often credited with
bringing stakeholder management into mainstream strategy literature, he recognizes that
the concept existed prior to the publishing of his book titled Strategic Management: A
Stakeholder’s Approach. Specifically, an international memorandum of the Stanford
Research Institute in 1963 refers to stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders were
considered as groups of individuals that were necessary for the continued functioning of
the organization, and therefore understanding the needs of stakeholders would allow the
organization to create better strategic plans. Though Freeman’s (1984) book was not the
original champion of this idea, it extended earlier work by establishing stakeholder theory
as a unique way to describe the intricacy of organizations and their environments, and it
explained that a moral obligation to balance the interests of all stakeholders must be
considered by managers. This framework encourages researchers to push beyond limited
conceptualizations of the firm as only involving owners and customers.
Freeman’s (1984) primary line of reasoning is that the success of the firm lies
with managers understanding the needs of their stakeholders. This notion was developed
from several literature streams including corporate planning, systems theory, corporate
social responsibility, and organization theory. He argues that as the external environment
in which firms operate continues to grow in complexity, it will become increasingly
difficult to adhere to all stakeholder demands. These changes in the environment, for
Freeman, require a modernization in the thinking of, and the actual operation of the firm.
Freeman’s broad definition, which allows for a large number of groups or individuals to
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be considered as possessing the characteristics of a stakeholder, further enhances his
argument that adhering to stakeholder demands will increase in difficulty.
Stakeholder management is predicated on the concept of stakeholders who have
relationships with each other and the firm and who can affect the organization.
Stakeholders are often defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). To gain
support from its stakeholders, the organization must interact with stakeholders by
identifying their interests in the firm (stakes), and then the organization must try to satisfy
their needs. The needs of different stakeholder groups are often contradictory to each
other. This forces managers to use a set of criteria to decide which stakeholder or group
of stakeholders should have their needs met first. Competing claims on the firm do have
some dependency and reciprocal benefit upon one another but it is often difficult to
assess an accurate level of impact.
To effectively serve this newly explained and complex organizational purpose,
Freeman (1984) proposes a stakeholder management process with the following four
steps. First, stakeholders relevant to particular issues for which the firm is trying to plan
should be identified. Second, management must determine the stakes for each
stakeholder group and the level of importance that each possesses. Next, management
assesses the current effectiveness of the company to meet the needs of the identified
stakeholder groups. Finally, management changes their policies in an attempt to better
meet the needs of those groups who were identified as not receiving sufficient
consideration in step three. According to Mitchell et al (1997), the policies that
management employs to reach particular goals can be firm-centered or system-centered.
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Firm-centered goals include firm survival, flexibility to grow through new opportunities,
public policy influence, etc. System-centered goals attempt to offer equity to all
stakeholders in the form of leveraging stakeholder interests and claims. Freeman claims
that this process will shift management’s attention away from unnecessary activities and
towards stakeholders on which the organization depends for success.
Freeman’s thesis triggered an abundance of work within several literature streams
but it also inspired authors to further refine stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston,
1995). It is this abundance of work in such a short time period that Donaldson and
Preston (1995) claim causes some confusion found in stakeholder theory. They maintain
that “anyone looking into this large and evolving literature with a critical eye will observe
that the concepts stakeholder, stakeholder model, stakeholder management, and
stakeholder theory are explained and used by various authors in very different ways and
supported with diverse and often contradictory evidence and arguments” (Donaldson &
Preston, 1995, p. 66). In light of these issues, the authors successfully clarified the
contradictory terminology and arguments in the literature by offering their take on the
common themes and problems. This framework classifies much of the efforts in the
development of stakeholder theory into one of three methods: instrumental, normative,
and descriptive. These three categories are considered to be nested within each other (see
Figure 2.1 below).

20

Normative
Instrumental
Descriptive

Figure 2.1
Three Aspects of Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995)
Stakeholder theory has often been approached from a descriptive viewpoint. By
being descriptive, authors provide a common language for the community of scholars to
convey their understanding of the relationships between the firm and its stakeholders.
While simply basing stakeholder theory in descriptive terms is inadequate (Waddok &
Graves, 1997), description does offer necessary information to later be used when making
instrumental predictions regarding causality and performance. Next, the instrumental
view of stakeholder theory “establishes a framework for examining the connections, if
any, between the practice of stakeholder management and the achievement of various
corporate performance goals” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 67). This line of research
is not surprising considering a central goal of all strategy research is to further understand
what management practices can be related to company performance (Rumelt, Schendel &
Teece, 1995). Finally, the normative view of stakeholder theory provides an underlying
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basis for stakeholder theory in that its main assumption is the intrinsic value of any one
stakeholder should not take priority over other stakeholders. All stakeholders should
receive equitable treatment when decisions are to be made. The authors summarize how
these three approaches are nested within each other:
“The external shell of the theory is its descriptive aspect; the theory presents and
explains relationships that are observed in the external world. The theory’s
descriptive accuracy is supported, at the second level, by its instrumental and
predictive value; if certain practices are carried out, then certain results will be
obtained. The central core of the theory is, however, normative. The descriptive
accuracy of the theory presumes that the truth of the core normative conception,
insofar as it presumes that managers and other agents act as if all stakeholders’
interests have intrinsic value. In turn, recognition of these ultimate moral values
and obligations give stakeholder management its fundamental normative base”
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995: p. 74).
The three approaches described by Donaldson and Preston (1995) guided
subsequent research and also have encouraged scholars to further develop and debate the
ideas set forth (e.g., Jones & Wicks, 1999). This dissertation takes an instrumental
approach, which is supplemented by a descriptive discussion of the interrelationships
found in family firms when considering stakeholder issues.

Stakeholder Theory Applications
Stakeholder theory is used to try to answer three questions: Who are the
stakeholders of the firm? What do they want? And finally, how are they going to get
what they want (Frooman, 1999)? Thus, management looks at what attributes or
characteristics make up a stakeholder, what stakes or interests they have in the firm, and
the strategies that the stakeholders intend to use to make sure they receive benefits from
the firm.
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The identification of particular stakeholders and stakeholder groups has been
debated since the time of Freeman’s (1984) seminal work and it continues to be discussed
today. Identification of stakeholders will be based on a number of characteristics
including what stakes they have in the firm. The inclusion of stakes as a way to classify
stakeholders shows some overlap between Frooman’s (1999) first and second questions.
It is necessary to distinguish between stakeholders based on stakes because not all
stakeholder groups will be homogenous in this area (Mitchell et al., 1997). For example,
all employees of a firm may not have the same stakes in mind. Some may be more
geared towards a particular work environment rather than a relatively high salary.
The second question also brings to mind the concept of stakeholder salience
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Salience refers to the process of deciding which stakeholders are
actually important to the firm and whether or not they are considered when decision
making occurs. When discussing the topic of salience, scholars are trying to decipher
who really counts to management when making decisions (Mitchell et al., 1997). If a
manager is able to understand the stakes that each stakeholder group possesses, then he
may be able to increase his effectiveness in dealing with these groups (Frooman, 1999).
Frooman’s (1999) final question tries to understand the strategies that
stakeholders may use to ensure their stakes are adhered to. By understanding their
strategies, managers can better handle strategic actions by stakeholders and can develop
strategies of their own to make sure they meet as many salient stakeholder demands as
possible. Clarkson (1995) describes the actions that management may take in different
situations. Clarkson argues that a defensive or reactive strategy where management
simply reacts to arising problems each day is less effective than having a proactive
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strategy towards stakeholders where management predicts the concerns of stakeholders
and tries to alleviate them prior to stakeholders enforcing their claims.
This dissertation does not focus on Frooman’s final question regarding the
strategies used by stakeholders to influence the firm. Instead, the primary objective of
this dissertation is to demarcate the main stakeholders of the family firm, discuss each
group’s salience or ability to influence the firm, and show that this influence can affect
firm performance. A lengthy discussion of the strategies used by stakeholders for
influence over the firm is unnecessary at this point because it can be assumed that
determining the extent to which each group gets what it wants can be found by assessing
their level of salience. Put differently, if salience implies influence, then the strategies
used to create that influence poses a topic for future research but not a necessary topic to
determine the affect of salience on firm performance.

Stakeholder Identification
Answering the question of who is a stakeholder can often be difficult and in many
instances, research attempting to detail who is and who is not a stakeholder becomes very
controversial. Construction of a definition that is accepted by all scholars is an endeavor
that has been, to date, unsuccessful. A typical debate in the literature revolves around the
broadness of the definition utilized. The most commonly accepted definition is “any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). The broad nature of this definition has received
much refinement, yet the original definition continues to be used often for theory
development (Mitchell et al., 1997).
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Another issue with the broadness of Freeman’s (1984) definition is the
directionality of stakes. Freeman argues that when stakes are not met, stakeholders will
withhold resources. In other words, stakeholders are affected by the firm and they can
affect it too. Interestingly though, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) argue that this does not
imply reciprocation, which is different from contractually based conceptualizations of
firm behavior such as agency theory (i.e., Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Reciprocation
implies that stakeholders would always react in accordance to the actions taken by the
firm to meet their needs. Mitchell et al. (1997) instead describe the relationship as one
where stakeholders ‘can’ react but do not do so in every instance. This characteristic of
stakes further complicates mangers’ decision making process.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) prescribe the following solution to the problem of
meeting multiple needs of different stakeholder groups while remaining profitable:
“equip managers with the ability to recognize and respond effectively to a disparate, yet
systematically comprehensible, set of entities who may or may not have legitimate
claims, but who may be able to affect or are affected by the firm nonetheless, and thus
affect the interest of those who do have legitimate claims” (p. 857). In other words,
managers must have the autonomy and flexibly to meet the needs of many groups of
stakeholders whether their claims are legitimate or not.
Wheeler and Sillanpaa (1997) also develop a framework of stakeholders that takes
on a very broad connotation. The four categories utilized to describe stakeholders are
primary social, secondary social, primary non-social, and secondary non-social. Table
2.1 outlines these four categories (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997, p. 197-198). Primary
stakeholders are those stakeholders necessary for the success of the firm. They include
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all internal stakeholders such as employees and shareholders, and all external
stakeholders who have a direct relationship with the firm, such as business partners, the
local community, and suppliers. Secondary stakeholders have much less influence over
the success of the firm but in certain circumstances they can become primary
stakeholders. Secondary stakeholders are always external stakeholders of the firm and as
shown in Table 2.1, nearly anyone outside the direct confines of the firm can fall into the
secondary stakeholder category. Social stakeholders are those stakeholders who directly
interact with the firm for human needs while non-social stakeholders, such as the
environment and animal species, either do not interact directly with the firm because they
take on a non-human form or they do interact directly with the firm because they are
represented by people.
Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholders has frequently been narrowed to meet
the needs of various researchers. The narrow definitions of stakeholders often try to take
into account real world variables that affect the ability of managers to make decisions for
the longevity of the firm. These definitions typically tie the relevance of stakeholder
interests to the economic impact that they will have on the firm (Mitchell et al., 1997).
For example, Evan & Freeman (1993) view stakeholders as individuals or groups that
contribute to the capacity of a firm to generate wealth. Freeman and Reid (1983, p. 91)
gave a similar definition that claimed stakeholders are those groups “on which the
organization is dependent for its continued survival.” Overall, these definitions try to
reduce the number of groups who can be considered stakeholders to reduce the
complexity in their discussion while also making it simpler to prescribe actions to
practitioners.
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Table 2.1
Stakeholder Identification
Primary Social Stakeholders

Secondary Social Stakeholders

● Shareholders and other investors

● Government and regulators

● Employees and managers

● Civic institutions

● Customers

● Social pressure groups

● Local Communities

● Media and academic commentators

● Suppliers and business partners

● Trade bodies
● Competitors

Primary Nonsocial Stakeholders

Secondary Nonsocial Stakeholders

● The natural environment

● Environmental interest groups

● Future generations

● Animal welfare organizations

● Nonhuman species

Source: (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997)
In summary, stakeholders have been identified through various broad and narrow
definitions or classifications schemes. Unfortunately, no one universal definition has
been agreed upon at this time. Therefore, this dissertation uses Freeman’s (1984) classic
definition but focuses only on the internal stakeholders found in Wheeler and Sallanpaa’s
(1997) primary social stakeholder category (shareholders, employees, and managers).
This definition was chosen because it is consistent with a large portion of the literature
and because of its emphasis on the directionality of influence by stakeholders and the
firm. To be discussed later, in many instances family firms are closely held companies,
which implies that very few groups have strong influence on the firm. The family both
influences and is influenced by the operation of the firm. Consequently, directionality of
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influence is an important concept when talking about family firms. Reducing the
discussion to only the primary stakeholders (Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997) also fits well
with the idea that many family firms are closely held. The owners and managers are
highly concentrated giving them much discretion when making business decisions.
Finally, recent developments in the literature, in particular salience of stakeholder groups,
have moved research beyond definitional issues and on to the task of interpreting which
stakeholder groups actually influence decisions made by the firm. Thus, by focusing on
the primary stakeholders who appear to have the most influence on the firm, this
dissertation will further knowledge for both stakeholder theorists and family firm
researchers.

Stakeholder Salience
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) present a table that shows the chronology of the
stakeholder definitions and their stakes (See Table 2.2 below). They use this chronology
to identify common themes in stakeholder theory. They also reviewed the ways that the
term “stake” has been utilized in the literature and recognized core attributes for the
identification of stakeholders (power and legitimacy). These attributes were then
combined with an environmental factor (urgency) with the intention of assessing the
salience of particular stakeholders and stakeholder groups.
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Table 2.2
Who is a Stakeholder? A Chronology (Mitchell et al., 1997: p. 858)
Stanford memo, 1963
Rhenman, 1964
Ahlstedt &
Jahnukainen, 1971
Freeman & Reed,
1983: 91
Freeman, 1984: 46
Freeman & Gilbert,
1987: 397
Cornell & Shapiro,
1987: 5
Evan & Freeman,
1988: 75-76
Evan & Freeman,
1988: 79
Bowie, 1988, 112, n. 2
Alkhafaji, 1989: 36
Carroll, 1989: 57
Freeman & Evan, 1990
Thompson et al, 1991:
209
Savage et al., 1991: 61
Hill & Jones, 1992:
133
Brenner, 1993: 205
Carroll, 1993: 60
Freeman, 1994: 415
Wicks et al., 1994: 483
Langtry, 1994: 443
Starik, 1994: 90
Clarkson, 1994: 5
Clarkson, 1995: 106
Nasi, 1995: 19
Donaldson & Preston,
1995: 85

“those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist”
(cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983, and Freeman, 1984)
“are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals and on whom
the firm is depending for its existence” (cited in Nasi, 1995)
“driven by their own interests and goals are participants in a firm, and thus
depending on it and whom for its sake the firm is depending” (cited in Nasi,
1995)
Wide: “can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is
affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”
“can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”
“can affect or is affected by a business”
“claimants” who have “contracts”
“have a stake in or claim on the firm”
“benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by,
corporate actions”
“without whose support the organization would cease to exist”
“groups to whom the corporation is responsible”
“asserts to have on or more of these kinds of stakes” – “ranging from an interest
to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s assets or
property”
contract holders
in “relationship with an organization”
“have an interest in the actions of an organization and…the ability to influence
it”
“constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm…established through the
existence of an exchange relationship” who supply “the firm with critical
resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied
(by inducements)”
“having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an organization [such as]
exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral responsibilities”
“asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business” – may be affected
or affect…
Participants in “the human process of joint value corporation”
“interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation”
The firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or
legal claim on the firm
“can and are making their actual stakes known” – “are or might be influenced by,
or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization”
“bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital,
human or financial, something of value, in a firm” or “are placed at risk as a
result of a firm’s activities”
“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities
“interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible”
“persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive
aspects of corporate activity”
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Mitchell et al.’s (1997) review of stakeholder attributes and stakes found that
power and legitimacy might make up the foundation for a new type of stakeholder
identification typology. They suggest that this type of sorting criteria could be helpful in
identifying stakeholders that are important to the firm (Agle et al., 1999) and that this was
necessary because the most widely accepted definition of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984)
happens to be very broad. Their conceptualization of legitimacy adequately narrows the
stakeholder domain, while their conceptualization of power allows enough groups to be
considered stakeholders so that it is not too narrow (Agle et al., 1999).
The authors defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p.
866). The authors drew upon institutional theory (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977) and argued that the survival of the organization and its effectiveness may
hinge upon the acquisition of legitimacy by conforming to socially legitimate actions.
The legitimacy of a claim on a firm can be based on a number of things. Mitchell et al.
(1997) argued that it might derive from “contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral
right, at-risk status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company
actions” (Agle et al., 1999, p. 508). Legitimacy can be found at varying organizational
levels (Wood, 1991). Wood states that the most common levels of legitimacy are at the
individual, organizational, and societal levels. Next, they defined power as the ability of
a group or individual to be able to impose its will in a relationship with management
(Mitchell et al., 1997). The authors draw upon resource dependency theory (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) to show that the organization’s dependence upon resources critical to the
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operation of the firm warrants managerial attention to the stakeholder who possesses
them.
These two attributes of stakeholder salience are considered variables which can be
lost or obtained (power), or absent or present (legitimacy). When these two attributes are
combined they represent authority (Weber, 1947) for the stakeholders over the firm.
Complementing these two sorting criteria is the idea that claims on the firm have
time constraints that can magnify their salience. The authors argued that this attribute of
stakeholder salience is urgency; “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for
immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 864). Urgency is not explicit in any one
theory concerning the power and legitimacy of stakeholder groups, but it does take on an
implicit characteristic. For example, “institutional, resource dependence, and population
ecology theories treat it in terms of outside pressures on the firm” (Mitchell et al., 1997,
p. 864). Urgency creates perceptions of salience in the minds of managers by showing
that the claims of a stakeholder are critical to survival and that waiting to adhere to these
claims is unacceptable (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Without urgency, a
claim that only has either legitimacy or power may be overlooked.
From this, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) propose that the possession of these
three attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency, will lead to the identification of
stakeholders. The authors then use these three attributes to explain the idea of
stakeholder salience. Stakeholder salience is defined as “the degree to which managers
give priority to competing stakeholder claims” (Agle et al., 1999, p. 508). Salience is
argued to increase as the number of stakeholder attributes possessed increases. Thus,
stakeholder salience is positively related to the cumulative number of the stakeholder
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attributes present. For example, when a stakeholder possesses all three of the attributes, a
manager is more likely to give high priority to meeting that stakeholder’s demands when
making decisions. As the number of attributes decrease, the priority of the claims also
decreases.
Agle and co-authors (1999) took the description of these relationships and
developed a model to test the effects of the three stakeholder attributes on stakeholder
salience. They also hypothesized that the manager’s values would moderate the
relationship between stakeholder attributes and stakeholder salience. In their
conceptualization, value is measured as a categorical variable based on self or otherregarding interests of the manager. The arguments used to propose this addition to
Mitchell’s model are that managers attach importance to those things that match with
their personal values and that managers will have values somewhere between the anchor
points of profit maximization and other-regarding values. The authors hypothesized that
there would be a positive relationship between other-regarding values and corporate
social performance and a negative relationship with financial performance.
Agle et al. (1999) found that there was a positive relationship between the
proposed stakeholder attributes with stakeholder salience. However, they did not find a
moderating relationship from value upon the salience construct. Also, there were no
significant relationships found between the values of the CEO and corporate
performance. Finally, the authors failed to find a significant relationship between the
salience of stakeholder groups and performance. Although these results seem to be
present a bleak picture for this line of research, this is not the case. Indeed, the lack of

32

results opens the door for future research to develop finer grained measures along with a
research design that will better explain how stakeholder relationships affect the firm.

Summary
Stakeholder theory has developed substantially over the last 20 to 25 years. The
speed at which it grew caused some problems and raised questions about its ability to be
a commonly accepted theory in the management field. Donaldson and Preston (1995)
contributed substantially to the body of literature by thoroughly reviewing the literature
and deciphering the common themes within it. By doing this, the authors removed some
of the ambiguity and confusion concerning common terminology, theoretical
underpinnings, and the purpose of varying kinds of stakeholder approaches.
Because of the importance of achieving organizational goals and the increasing
complexity of intra-organizational relationships, the need for an approach to
systematically identify stakeholders and determine their salience becomes evident (Page,
2002). By establishing priorities for particular stakeholders and stakeholder groups, the
allocation of resources that are available to a firm may be more effective and efficient.
Mitchell and colleagues narrowed the most commonly accepted definition of stakeholders
(Freeman, 1984) by identifying three attributes that are necessary for an individual or
group to be considered a salient stakeholder in the minds of management. The authors
describe different types of stakeholders by showing that the possession of one or more of
the attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency will afford stakeholders at least a
minimum level of attention from management. Possession of these attributes can change
over time and therefore they have an evolutionary nature. Also, possession of more
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stakeholder attributes increases the level of salience in the minds of management. Thus,
stakeholder attributes are cumulative and positively related to stakeholder salience.
From this review of the literature, it is important to note that the applicability of
the idea of stakeholder salience hinges upon the argument that groups with higher
salience will influence decision makers to meet their demands. Thus, the actions taken
by management will in turn reflect the stakes that are held in high regard by each of the
stakeholder groups. It is the identification of these stakes, as well as the stakeholder
groups themselves, that will contribute to the development of a new model of stakeholder
salience which is then applied to family firms.
Also from this literature review, it is important to highlight the idea that conflict
arises when stakeholders have competing stakes in the firm. Managers will often be
forced to adhere to the claims of one to the detriment of the other. This conflict is
important only insofar as it leads to conflicting stakes, necessitating choices of which
stakeholders the firm will attempt to satisfy.
In the next section, family firm research is reviewed. Stakeholder groups within
the family firm, along with their stakes, are identified.

The Family Firm
No one knows the exact number of family firms in the world, but there is general
agreement that they are quite common (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Gutierrez,
2003), with estimates ranging from one-third, to one-half, to even greater proportions
with all firms either family controlled or owned (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer,
1999; Lansberg, 1983; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
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Differences in the estimated number of family firms can be attributed to the numerous
variations in its definition. It is not uncommon for social scientists to grapple with
creating boundaries for their ideas through definitional distinctions (Kuhn, 1970). Many
topics in more established fields than family business research continue to disagree on the
exact semantics of particular phenomena (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). But just as
Weick (1976) explains, there is a tradeoff that scholars must make for the generality,
accuracy, and simplicity of areas of study.
In family firm research, there is general agreement that the definition of a family
firm must take into account the role that family members play in the decision making
process along with the family’s ability to create capabilities and resources that are unique
to the firm (Chrisman et al., 2003a; Chrisman, Chua & Steier, 2003b; Habbershon &
Williams, 1999; Habbershon, Williams & MacMillan, 2003). Even so, at this time there
is no consensus upon the exact definition and boundaries of a family firm, but it seems
that the field is moving towards that end. This dissertation follows Chua, Chrisman, and
Sharma’s (1999, p. 25) definition of the family firm as “a business governed and/or
managed with the intentions to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a
dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of
families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or
families.” This particular definition is utilized because several components of the
definition are consistent with the tenets of stakeholder theory.
First, the idea of having a dominant coalition consisting of the same or a small
number of families implies that there is a family group operating the firm. As discussed
previously in this chapter, stakeholder theory tries to distinguish between certain
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stakeholder groups based on each groups’ characteristics and stakes. If there is no
“group” of family members within the firm, then potential influence on decision makers
is difficult to assess.
Second, this definition emphasizes the influence of family, ownership, and
management as important in shaping and pursuing the vision of the business. The
opportunity to shape and pursue the vision of the family business is consistent with the
idea that family firms have non-economic stakes that can influence family managers to
pursue goals which may be in conflict with typical economic business goals and financial
performance benchmarks (Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997). This conflict often arises
when family managers use resources for non-economic family stakes rather then putting
these resources back in to the business.
Finally, this dissertation focuses only on the three primary internal stakeholder
groups within the family firm. Family firm research primarily studies the internal
stakeholders of the firm and regards all others as part of the environment. In the family
firm, the importance of the most basic groups is magnified because the groups often play
multiple roles in the business and therefore have more influence over firm activities
(Gersick et al., 1997). Thus, this dissertation follows the lead of other researchers and
focuses on the internal stakeholders of the firm due to their importance and influence.
The following sections concerning family firms focus on answering several
questions. Who are the stakeholders in a family firm? What are their stakes? How do
decision makers decide which stakes to pursue? What conflicts arise due to the varying
levels of salience and stakes possessed by each group of stakeholders? How does the
salience of each of these groups along with the stakes they possess affect firm
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performance? To answer these questions, a number of areas of the family firm literature
are reviewed. Most importantly though, the three circle model of family businesses is
utilized as an overarching framework (Gersick et al., 1997).
Stakeholders in the Family Firm
Systems theory suggests that a family business possesses both a family and a
business system that function within a general environment (Davis & Stern, 1980;
Hollander, 1983). Further refinement of this concept (Taguiri & Davis, 1982) divided the
business system into management and ownership functions to account for the fact that all
managers are not owners and all owners do not take part in the operation of the business
(see Figure 2.2). Not only is this model a “useful tool for understanding different goals
and expectations, sources of interpersonal conflicts, role dilemmas, priorities and
boundaries in family firms” (Sharma, 2001, p. 5), but it also identifies the major
stakeholders of family businesses: owners, managers, and family.
Individuals in the family firm can be placed within any of the areas depicted in
Figure 2.2. For example, all family members can be found in the family system but not
all will be owners or managers at the same time. Individuals with more than one role in
the family business will be found within the overlapped circles and typically very few
people will be found in the center section which is an overlap of all three systems
(Gersick et al., 1997). Those individuals who find themselves a member of all three
systems of the family firm are often part of upper level management.
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Figure 2.2
The Three-Circle Model of the Family Firm
In this dissertation, focus lies upon owners, managers, and family as the primary
stakeholder groups, rather than perceiving the overlapped areas of the three groups as
separate stakeholder groups in and of themselves (Sharma, 2001). This distinction is
made because this dissertation will attempt to explain how the stakes and salience of
these three groups affect performance. It is of no consequence in this study if, for
example, an individual is a member of both family and management because that
individual is expected to possess distinctive stakes for both groups and therefore when
decision makers decide to adhere to these distinctive stakes they will in essence be
adhering to one group at a time. Just as Schumpeter (1934) described the entrepreneur as
both a capitalist and an entrepreneur with overlapping and yet distinct actions, this
dissertation contends that the decision maker in the family firm has the ability to create
distinction between groups even when he may be a member of multiple groups. The
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decision maker is not only able to make distinctions within the groups, the groups are
inherently separate. Using Schumpeter’s (1934) analogy of the entrepreneur and the
capitalist may shed further light on this issue:
“The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer. In our example this is quite clear. The
one who gives credit comes to grief if the undertaking fails. For although any
property possessed by the entrepreneur may be liable, yet such possession of
wealth is not essential, even though advantageous. But even if the entrepreneur
finances himself out of former profits, or if he contributes the means of
production belong to his “static” business, the risk falls on him as a capitalist or as
a possessor of goods, not as entrepreneur. Risk-taking is in no case an element of
entrepreneurial function. Even though he may risk his reputation, the direct
economic responsibility of failure never falls on him” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 137).
In this example, Schumpeter (1934) explains that when the entrepreneur takes
action as a capitalist, he is in fact acting as a capitalist and no longer acting as an
entrepreneur. If this is true, then the same individual should be able to compartmentalize
decision making based on the different roles of entrepreneur and capitalist. This is not to
say that there is no overlap or consideration of other roles when making decisions but it is
clear that each role has its own criteria for making decisions. Thus, this dissertation
argues that in the family firm the owner/manager/family member is able to think about
each role separately when making decisions. Since each of the three systems within the
family firm have their own set of actions, norms, goals, value structures, rules, etc. that
are often incongruent there is the potential for conflict to arise.
Conflict has been an important topic within the family firm literature (Sorenson,
1999) and is regularly cited as the reason for the downfall of many family firms (e.g.,
Levinson, 1971). A main issue pervading family firms is that the addition of the family
to the business system may influence top level management to take actions in light of
family goals over business goals (e.g., Taguiri & Davis, 1982) and these actions have the
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possibility of diverting funds away from the financial needs of the business. “If family
businesses are to obtain desired outcomes for both the business and the family, they must
learn to manage conflict in ways that will maintain family relationships…and respond to
all the interests in the business and the family” (Sorenson, 1999, p. 326). Sorenson goes
on to say that “this is especially true when family members are involved in some way in
the business as owners, managers, employees, or even nonparticipating stockholders”
(1999, p. 325). Thus, it is important to understand the stakes found in each of the family
firm stakeholder groups so that areas of conflict may be addressed.
Stakes of the Ownership Group. Business owners possess a number of stakes
that influence their decision making processes. The literature consistently shows that a
primary stake of the ownership stakeholder group is the maximization of wealth through
efficient and effective management of the business (e.g., Fiegener, 2005; Fiegener,
Brown, Dreux Iv & Dennis Jr, 2000a, b; Gersick et al., 1997; Olson et al., 2003).
Discussion of the maximization of shareholder or owner wealth can be found as early as
the writings of Adam Smith. Also, Birch (1987) argued that founders of firms have a
stronger predisposition to pursue economic rather than non-economic goals.
The ownership group tends to want long-term sustained growth of the business so
that it will provide higher levels of success over the long term which in turn will afford
them personal satisfaction (Daily & Dalton, 1992). The ownership group also has a great
need to stay in control of the business through coordination of the business in a direct and
personal manner (Gersick et al., 1997; Mintzberg, 1984). This is shown in several
articles concerning the relationship between the percentage of ownership by the firm
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leader (or CEO) and how many people sit on the board of directors (Fiegener, 2005;
Fiegener et al., 2000a, b). Companies with CEOs who have a very large financial stake
in the business are shown to have small boards of directors to maintain significant control
over the business. Also, boards with high concentration of ownership by the CEO were
shown to have less independent board members to increase their discretion when making
decisions (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Fiegener et al., 2000b). In other words, as the
amount of ownership increases amongst fewer individuals, these individuals will
increasingly attempt to control the business and will seek less advice from those
independent of the firm.
Finally, ownership not only provides the opportunity to generate wealth but also
imparts owners with a place of importance (i.e., Gersick et al., 1997). Owners of
companies are afforded a multitude of perks amongst their communities due to their
ability to employ their neighbors, support civic programs, etc. So, also at stake is the
owner’s own personal self-image and community identity (Lansberg, 1983).
Stakes of the Family Group. The participation of the family stakeholder group
in the operation of the family firm changes the scope of the economically driven stakes
held by non-family firms (Sharma et al., 1997). Family firms possess non-economic
stakes which may come into conflict with the business system during resource allocation.
Taguiri and Davis (1982) presented one of the earliest and most comprehensive studies
concerning stakes of the family business. Along with a number of business objectives,
the implication of their research was that families strived to meet the following
objectives: (1) provide financial benefits and security to the family members of the firm;
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(2) provide opportunity for growth, social/reputation advancement, and autonomy to
family members; and (3) provide job security to family members. More recently,
Chrisman and colleagues (2003a) suggested that not only do family firms focus on
providing employment for family members but they also want those employment
opportunities to provide avenues for growth and development of family members’
knowledge and skills.
Riordan and Riordan (1993) studied small family business from a field theory
perspective and found that family firms were interested in drawing upon the business to
be able to employ family members, spend more time with those family members, and to
develop family members through personal training processes. These findings
complement both Chrisman et al.’s (2003) emphasis that family firms desire to maintain
family harmony and Lansberg’s (1983) emphasis that family members perceive the firm
to be an important part of their family heritage. Also, Chrisman and colleagues (2003a)
explain that the provision of income to the family may not only be for short term
purposes. They describe the business as a way to create transgenerational value that the
family may use over a very long period of time. So, even though pursuit of financial
wealth may appear entirely economically driven it can serve other functions for the
family (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983a).
According to Kets de Vries (1996), family members will have a greater feeling of
independence because they may enjoy being in control of their own destiny. Kets de
Vries (1993) goes on to say that family members may gain narcissistic pleasure, along
with status and financial benefits by being a family member in the firm. Lastly, Kets de
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Vries claims family members may perceive the family business as a more peaceful
working environment than if they were working elsewhere.
Beckhard and Dyer (1983b) indicate that family firms are typically more
concerned with their communities than non-family firms. They suggest that family firms
distinguish themselves as providing employment and growth for their communities.
Similarly, family business may provide a channel for the family to build its reputation in
the community (Taguiri & Davis, 1982). From a practical standpoint, family reputation
may help the business build a close network of loyal customers, service providers, etc.
and can lead to higher levels of profitability. This long-term outlook towards reaching
financial goals (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) through community activism and
reputation may help family firms to overcome such things as short-lived downturns in the
economy and attacks by strong or new competitors.
Stakes of the Management Group. For management, the firm can be a vehicle
for professional development and economic achievement (Lansberg, 1983). The
management group within a firm will use the business as an opportunity to learn new
skills which may be utilized elsewhere. The management system also has typical
traditional business goals such as generating as much profit as possible and showing
consistent growth (Gersick et al., 1997). The need for large profits and sustained growth
serves more than one purpose though. The management group seeks competitive salary
and benefits packages, opportunities for career advancement, and assurance that
resources will be allocated to those who directly impact the financial stability of the firm.
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All of these things, except for the assurance of proper compensation, can be achieved by
being located in a company that performs fairly well.
The need to be adequately compensated is derived from the tenets of distributive
(Leventhal, 1976) and procedural justice (Greenberg, 1987; Thibaut & Walker, 1975)
where distributive justice is the fairness of decision outcomes and procedural justice is
the fairness of the processes utilized to make decisions. In the family firm, unfair reward
systems may arise due in part to the competing family and business systems (Van der
Heyden, Blondel & Carlock, 2005). Rewards and promotions may be given to those who
do not deserve them due to their status or association with the family stakeholder group,
which could in turn undermine the legitimacy of top management as an objective
decision maker. Manager’s work satisfaction may change due to this perceived injustice
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006).
As shown above, each of the three main stakeholder groups in the family firm
have multiple stakes in the firm. The owners are highly geared towards economic stakes
which are assessed with financial measures. The managers of the firm are interested in
compensation and job security, along with opportunities for advancement within the
company. Lastly, the family is concerned with making sure future family members have
a position with the business, keeping a strong reputation in the community, the financial
stability of the family, and continued involvement of family with the business. Each of
the stakes associated with the three stakeholder groups can affect economic and noneconomic performance measures. With this being the case, conflict – in relation to whose
stakes are met – will likely be present in family firms.
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Conflict in the Family Firm
The potential for conflict found within family firms is of no surprise considering
the relative complexity of this business form. Overlapping systems of ownership,
management, and family provide numerous opportunities for the competing interests of
each group to require decision makers to select one group over another. This is
exacerbated by the presence of a controlling family who executes overlapping control and
management activities (Daily & Dollinger, 1992b). Conflict may also arise during
transition periods within the family and business life cycles (Gersick et al., 1997) and this
may increase the probability of firm failure (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983b; Chrisman, Steier
& Chua, 2006; Kets de Vries, 1993). Fortunately conflict does not always suggest
deleterious effects on firm performance (Harvey & Evans, 1994; Sharma et al., 1997) and
at times may lead to better decision making (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). Indeed,
conflict concerning how tasks should be accomplished along with conflict concerning
who should be involved and in what capacity in the process to accomplish work can help
firms to better understand their businesses (Jehn, 1995; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). For
example, conflict arising over the selection of an unqualified family member to a
management position may result in a change in standard operating procedures by the firm
for future human resource decisions.
The most important issue concerning the level of conflict in the family firm is that
conflict arising from incongruent stakes possessed by owners, managers, and family may
require choices to be made that will influence the economic and non-economic
performance of the family firm. The family’s perception of that conflict is also important
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because the success of the family, rather than the success of the business, may be
predicated on the ability of the family to work with each other in a harmonious manner.
Theory Addressing Conflict: Agency Theory. Agency relationships are
contracts “under which one or more persons (the principles) engage another person or
persons (the agent) to perform services on their behalf that involves delegating decision
making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Agency theory
assumes that individuals will act in ways that benefit their own self-interest (Eisenhardt,
1989) and when self-interest seeking agents are given control to act on the behalf of the
principles conflict may arise because principles’ expectations and agents actions may
differ. The assumption was made that family firms would have no conflicts of interest
because very often principles and agents are one in the same (Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000).
This account of agency relationships is inaccurate because agency costs in family
firms may stem from relational contracts which are less specific with regards to how
agents should act on behalf of principles (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). The relaxed
structure of relational contracts allows room for family members to take advantage of job
perks, use familial power to unnecessarily influence non-family employees, to hire less
qualified and ambitious applicants from within the family, etc. (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001), all of which may redirect resources
away from the economic needs of the business. These types of agency costs can also
increase relationship conflict (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004) and effectively reduce
family harmony because actions taken by agents deviating from principles’ best interest
may be seen as personal in nature since family and business systems are intertwined.
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Last, the presence of altruism, where altruism is a character trait where one individual’s
welfare is positively linked to the welfare of others (Bergstrom, 1995; Kellermanns &
Eddleston, 2004) may unnecessarily increase the level of salience of family members
which may influence decision makers to adhere to their claims over the claims of the
other primary stakeholder groups.

Family Firms and Performance
Another important issue in family firm research is the link between family
involvement and company performance. Lee and Rogoff (1996) concluded that family
businesses and non-family businesses differ in the goals that they set. Some of the goals
set by family firms can be seen in the preceding discussion of stakes within the threecircle model. The goals may take on non-economic characteristics and it is these
characteristics that have researchers and practitioners alike investigating how family
firms survive when they apply resources of the firm towards non-economic ends. Even
though non-economic goals are repeatedly reported as important to family firms
(Chrisman, Chua & Zahra, 2003c; Lee & Rogoff, 1996; Steier, 2003) there is not much
empirical research testing their effects on firm performance and that which has been done
is not comparable to studies with similar aims (Hienerth & Kessler, 2006). Therefore the
definition of success in the family business is often ambiguous (Hienerth & Kessler,
2006; Olson et al., 2003; Stafford et al., 1999).
A good explanation of the different goals set in family firms is demonstrated by
the following:
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“For a business to be sustainable as a family firm in the highly competitive global
market of the twenty-first century there must be a synergistic and symbiotic
relationship between the family and the business. The business must perform in a
way that creates value for the family and the family must add value to the
business in a manner that is impossible without family involvement. Otherwise,
there would be no advantage to having family involvement. Consequently, the
goals of a family firm are likely to be broader than wealth maximization because
this goal only addresses the business side of the family-business dyad” (Chua,
Chrisman & Steier, 2003, p. 331).
From this statement it is apparent that family business research should aim to
assess both economic and non-economic measures of family firm success. From an
economic standpoint, a number of research projects have shown that family firms
perform quite well when compared to non-family firms (i.e., Anderson, Mansi & Reeb,
2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Lee, 2006). Most recently, Lee
(2006) showed that family firms outperformed non-family firms through employment and
revenue growth and that this performance was further enhanced when founding family
members were involved in the management of the business. Lee attests this performance
to the considerable amount of risk encountered by the family due to a heightened level of
concentrated ownership. The owners more closely and actively monitor the actions of
management in this situation and thus active involvement by family members increases
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
The most important distinction in this dissertation concerning family firm
performance is the argument that family firms perform on economic and non-economic
levels and that it is imperative to assess performance on both levels. It is also argued that
achieving higher levels of one type of performance may come at the expense of the other.
If this is the case, then this study may be able to show how family firm decision makers
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are able to balance the stakes of each primary stakeholder group and simultaneously meet
multiple performance measures. Conversely, it can be argued that an increase in
harmony in the family may lead to improved financial performance due to family
members being happier in their jobs. The difference between this idea and the idea that
family harmony and financial performance are diametrically opposed is this dissertation
assumes family harmony will be based on the level of conflict found in the family, where
conflict is predicated upon how often family stakes are met. Therefore, this dissertation
intends to offer an alternative way to assess performance in family firms and could lead
to more consistent results when comparing family firms amongst other family firms and
with non-family firms.

Different Types of Family Firms
Thus far family firms have been described in this dissertation as a homogenous
group of firms that possess similar characteristics and stakes which lead to a number of
processes and actions. Similarly, in the literature family firms are often discussed
dichotomously as either a family business or a non-family business. However, there are
many different variations of family firms and these variations can make quite a difference
when particular activities in the firm take place. Accounting and controlling for these
differences is necessary when studying family firms. Therefore, it is important to discuss
how family firms may differ.
Gersick et al. (1997) offered the most comprehensive examination of the different
types of family firms. The primary contribution from their research resulted in a
typology consisting of three ownership types that may occur over what they designate as
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the life-cycle of family firms. The description of these ownership types hinge
predominantly upon the number of owners involved in the family firm.
First, many firms begin as “controlling owner” firms where an entrepreneur
spearheads a campaign to start a new company and then grows the business in such a way
as to allow family members to begin working for the company. One advantage of this
type of family business is that even though other family members have joined the
business, the entrepreneur typically retains the majority of control. This may reduce
potential sources of conflict concerning decision making. Unfortunately for the
controlling owner, the lack of larger numbers of family members involved with the
business reduces the opportunity for those family members to provide resources which
may facilitate business growth and profitability (Habbershon & Williams, 1999).
Gersick et al. (1997) next describe the “sibling partnership.” A sibling
partnership involves either two or more siblings being brought into the business by their
father/mother to keep the business in the family name or siblings coming together to start
their own a business. Power is typically divided amongst family members at this point
and this division may lead to conflict amongst family members. Conflict at this time may
also come as a consequence of redistribution of the firm’s financial assets from the single
owner to several family members.
Finally, a family business may enter the “cousin consortium” stage of ownership.
In this stage, the firm is most likely in its third generation and several families may now
run the business. Not all family firms move in this direction due to a number of factors
including firm failure and the fact that many family firms do not last past the second
generation (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983a). Also, some family firms revert back to the
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controlling owner or cousin consortium forms because some members of the family no
longer want to work for the family business and hence sell their share of the business to a
single or multiple family members. The cousin consortium further distributes power and
financial resources amongst many family members and again may lead to changes in the
scale and scope of conflict but this conflict can be thwarted by the ability of these family
members to provide other resources necessary for the firm to function profitably
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999).
In each of these types of ownership, there are unique challenges and advantages
but, importantly, each ownership type continues to promote the inclusion of family in the
operation of the business. Consequently, the family develops in conjunction with
changes in ownership. Gersick et al. (1997) described four stages of change for the
family within the family firm. Importantly, the stakes of the family may change
substantially in each stage (Sharma et al., 1997). The change in stakes can be identified
by looking at the key challenges facing families during each stage.
First, the family is said to be a “young business family.” The key challenges of
the young business family include creating a workable marriage enterprise, working out
relationships with extended family members, and raising children. The second stage is
called the “entering the business” stage and the key challenges are managing midlife
transitions, separating the younger generation, and facilitating a sound process for initial
career decisions. Next, the family moves into the “working together” stage. In this stage
the key challenges the family faces are: fostering cross-generational cooperation and
communication, encouraging productive conflict management, and managing a company
that now has multiple generations of family members to consider. Finally, the family
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transitions to the “passing the baton” stage of family development. The key challenges
are disengaging the senior generation from the business and transferring leadership over
the generations of family members.
The key challenges will dictate what stakes are more important to the family. For
instance, in the third stage of development, it will be very important for the business to
provide employment to family members who have recently become adults. This may be
very different to the first stage of development where providing education to family
members who have yet to join the business would be very important. Thus, the multiple
stages of the family should be controlled for when studying family businesses so as to
parse out these types of differences.
The business also changes during the transitions of ownership and family.
Gersick et al. (1997) described the changes as a business life cycle but geared their
analysis more specifically to family businesses. The authors used three stages to
accomplish this task: start-up, expansion/formalization, and maturity. First, businesses
are in the “start-up” stage which is characterized by a very informal structure with few
products and challenged by needs for survival. The second stage is the
“expansion/formalization” stage where the business becomes more formalized in
structure, has increased its product lines, is challenged by growing separation of
ownership and control, and has problems regarding strategic planning and cash
management. Finally, the business will enter what Gersick and colleagues (1997) call the
“maturity” stage of business development where the business is characterized by a stable
organizational structure composed of layers and divisions and a well established
organizational routine, but challenged by a need for reinvestment of funds, a refocus on
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the company’s strategy, and reduced commitment by owners and managers. Again, in
each of these stages the stakes of the members of the business may change. For example,
in the maturity stage, the business should have rules in place for fair/equitable hiring and
promotion processes which reflect the needs of the business. The business needs
employees who are committed to the continued success of the business and it is
imperative that those who are hired are capable to meet the complexities of a larger,
mature organization. Also, the business may need new product lines, through
reinvestment of funds, to further increase firm profitability.
So, as the family business goes through each of these stages from an ownership,
family, and business viewpoint, different kinds of conflict may arise from meeting the
most pressing and changing needs of each stakeholder group.

Summary
Family firm research has grown substantially in quantity and quality over the last
few decades. Issues regarding definitional clarity, broad or narrow focus, goal
development and attainment, conflict, governance, and success have dominated the
literature. Family firms often times harbor and pursue non-economic goals that could
prove detrimental to the financial well being of the company but reduced agency costs in
the firm may negate this reduction in profits. It is clear from the literature that all family
firms do not look the same. Family firms grow and change based on each of the three
systems in the three-circle model. From this it appears necessary to try to account for the
differences between them with adequate research design.
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In the following section, stakeholder theory and family firm research will be
combined with the intent to better describe how influence on decision making from the
main stakeholders in a family firm can affect firm performance from an economic and
non-economic perspective.

Stakeholder Salience in the Family Firm: Model and Hypotheses
The literature concerning stakeholder theory and family firms have developed
independently of each other for a number of years (Sharma, 2001). Both literature
streams appear to be concerned with the different groups working within a firm and both
have attempted to prescribe best practices to accommodate increasingly complex
conceptualizations of business. Moreover, there appears to be a need to bring these
literatures together and by doing so, both literatures will benefit from the combination
rather than one being simply applied to the other.
The primary difference between the two literatures is the focus on the type of firm
studied or discussed. Stakeholder research has been dominated by studies on large,
publicly held firms which are typically operated by professional managers while family
firm research targets businesses that do not have to be large and in most cases are
operated by founding family members and their descendants (Sharma, 2001). Also,
family firm research has been focused primarily on the internal factors that affect the firm
while stakeholder theory has given much credence to external groups who affect firms.
The family business literature indicates a need for new theoretical developments
that effectively explain the reciprocal nature of relationships amongst the many actors in
family businesses. Thus, to meet this need the following sections will develop a model
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and testable hypotheses within that model by utilizing Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997)
stakeholder salience concept and the systems perspective from family business literature.
This model has the potential to better “explain how different players, through their
interplay of stakes…in formulating organizational goals and strategies cause resources to
be acquired and agency costs to be eliminated or amplified” (Chrisman et al., 2005, p.
569).

Model Development
The prior sections of this dissertation have addressed the theoretical
underpinnings of stakeholders and family firms. As stated previously, for the purpose of
this research it is necessary to restrict the use of stakeholders to internal stakeholders
only. Family firm research has, except in a few instances, only addressed the internal
stakeholders of the firm (Sharma, 2001). Future research may be able to use the
developments herein to build a model capable of incorporating external stakeholders, but
it is important to first explain the relationships that are occurring within the family firm,
rather than unnecessarily complicating the task at hand. To continue with this theme of
simplification, the following section will first describe the original relationships set forth
by Mitchell and colleagues (1997) which will then lead to increasingly more complex
models until the final model of Stakeholder Salience in the Family Firm is presented. At
that point, hypotheses will be developed to theoretically explain the relationships in the
final model.
In the development of the concept of stakeholder salience (Agle et al., 1999;
Mitchell et al., 1997), the authors described and later tested a model which showed
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positive relationships between the three antecedents of legitimacy, power, and urgency
with stakeholder salience. However, given that it is necessary to respond to stakeholders
in such a way as to ensure that their needs are met, one must analyze both the salience of
stakeholders and the stakes that they deem important in order to understand how different
stakeholders influence firm performance. Put simply, it is the pursuit of stakes that
influences decision makers’ behavior and firm performance.
While stakeholders’ salience is important it is only when examining stakeholders’
stakes that a true picture of their influence on firm performance can be achieved. This
requires consideration for both stakeholder salience and stakes, and, most importantly,
the interaction between salience and stakes. Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of stakeholder
salience implicitly assumes that all stakeholders have a well defined set of stakes and
therefore measuring salience will tease out the effects of stakes on performance. But, if
you have different stakes in different firms then the variation in performance may be lost.
Measuring the stakes first and then how salience influences the relationship between
stakes and performance will give you a better prediction of performance.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) described a direct relationship between salience
and performance and consequently they focused on the influence of particular groups to
persuade decision makers to meet their demands rather than focusing on the actions taken
for those groups. However, as described above, I argue that prior to considering salience,
the relationship between the stakes of the stakeholders, which dictate management
actions, and the performance of the firm must be investigated. This is a necessary change
because it is the stakes which managers give credence in decision making that will
influence performance. Additionally, I argue that stakeholder salience will have a
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positive, moderating effect on the relationship between the stakes of the stakeholder
groups and performance. In other words, as the decision maker’s perception of a
stakeholder group’s salience increases, the relationship between the stakeholder group’s
stakes and performance will be magnified either positively or negatively depending on
the nature of the group’s stakes. This is because the stakes of salient stakeholders will
have the greatest influence on managerial decision making.
In Figure 2.3, Mitchell et al.’s (1999) original argument for a direct relationship
between salience and performance along with a new conceptualization of that
relationship developed herein is illustrated. Take note also that Agle et al. (1999) were
unsuccessful in establishment of a significant relationship with the variable “CEO
Values.” Although, this is not specifically included in the new model, it is somewhat
similar to measuring the stakes of the decision makers.
The new model contains the construct stakes and this construct leads to additional
changes which must be addressed. The three circle model of family business was
previously used as the framework for identifying the main internal stakeholder groups in
the family firm. It was noted that family firms are composed of an ownership group, a
family group, and a management group. Consequently, each of these groups was
reviewed and their stakes in the firm were discussed. The stakes of these three groups are
divergent in many ways and therefore they may have nuanced relationships with
performance. So, to compensate for this possibility the following model was developed
(See Figure 2.4 below).
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Original Hypothesized Relationships by Mitchell et al. (1997)
Salience

+

Performance

New Hypothesized Relationships
Stakes

Performance
+
Salience

Figure 2.3
Illustration of Basic Hypothesized Relationships
The new model contains the construct stakes and this construct leads to additional
changes which must be addressed. The three circle model of family business was
previously used as the framework for identifying the main internal stakeholder groups in
the family firm. It was noted that family firms are composed of an ownership group, a
family group, and a management group. Consequently, each of these groups was
reviewed and their stakes in the firm were discussed. The stakes of these three groups are
divergent in many ways and therefore they may have nuanced relationships with
performance. So, to compensate for this possibility the following model was developed
(See Figure 2.4 below).
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Ownership
Salience

Family
Salience

MGT
Salience

Ownership
Stakes

Family
Stakes

Performance

MGT
Stakes

Figure 2.4
Simplified Family Firm Stakeholder Salience Model
Notice again that this model is simplified in that it does not present the
directionality of the relationships between the stakes of the three stakeholder groups and
performance. When reviewing the literature on family firms, it became apparent that
family firms have a multitude of non-economic performance goals. These goals require
that a new model of stakeholder salience in the family firm incorporate both economic
and non-economic performance measures. Since, the different stakeholder groups in the
family firm have distinct stakes based on economic and non-economic issues; one would
expect that the sign of these relationships may change with each performance type.
Therefore, Figure 2.5 depicts the full model of relationships, which now includes each of
the three primary internal stakeholder groups in the family firm and two performance
measures.
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Performance

Family
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MGT
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Non-Economic
Performance

Figure 2.5
Full Model: Family Firm Stakeholder Salience Model
Lastly, the antecedents of stakeholder salience will not be tested in this
dissertation because this relationship was already empirically established by Agle et al.
(1999) and because the authors provided a scale to test salience that was highly correlated
with the three antecedents of legitimacy, urgency, and power. When a respondent
possessed each of these three antecedents in the previous study, the individual also scored
very highly on the unidimensional construct of stakeholder salience and therefore the
redundancy of having four scales versus one scale was unnecessary. Also, the primary
purpose of this dissertation is not concerned with the causes of stakeholder salience, but
is interested in the affects of salience upon performance indirectly through the stakes of
each stakeholder group.
Table 2.2 presents the hypothesized relationships. This table is then followed by
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 which separate the full model (Figure 2.5) of the Family Stakeholder
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Salience Model into two models based on economic and non-economic performance to
offer an easier way to discuss the relationships hypothesized.
Table 2.3
List of Hypotheses

H1a
H1b
H1c

H1d

H2a
H2b
H2c

H2d

H3a
H3b
H3c

Hypotheses
The stakes of the ownership stakeholder group will be
positively related to economic performance.
The stakes of the ownership stakeholder group will be
negatively related to non-economic performance.
The salience of the ownership stakeholder group will moderate
the relationship between ownership stakes and economic
performance, where higher ownership salience will further
increase economic performance.
The salience of the ownership stakeholder group will moderate
the relationship between ownership stakes and non-economic
performance, where higher ownership salience will further
decrease non-economic performance.
The stakes of the family stakeholder group will be negatively
related to economic performance.
The stakes of the family stakeholder group will be positively
related to non-economic performance.
The salience of the family stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between family stakes and economic performance,
where higher family salience will further decrease economic
performance.
The salience of the family stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between family stakes and non-economic
performance, where higher family salience will further
increase non-economic performance.
The stakes of the management stakeholder group will be
negatively related to economic performance.
The stakes of the management stakeholder group will be
negatively related to non-economic performance.
The salience of the management stakeholder group will
moderate the relationship between management stakes and
economic performance, where higher management salience
will further decrease economic performance.
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Table 2.3 continued
List of Hypotheses
H3d The salience of the management stakeholder group will
moderate the relationship between management stakes and
non-economic performance, where higher management
salience will further decrease non-economic performance.

Ownership
Salience

Family
Salience

H1c
Ownership
Stakes

Family
Stakes

H2c

MGT
Salience
H3c

H1a
+

H2a
-

Economic
Performance

H3a
MGT
Stakes

Figure 2.6
Tested Model Part A: Family Firm Stakeholder Salience Model – Economic Performance
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Family
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H3d

H1b
-

H2b
+

Non-economic
Performance

H3b
MGT
Stakes

Figure 2.7
Tested Model Part B: Family Firm Stakeholder Salience Model – Non-Economic
Performance

Hypotheses Development
The first two hypotheses (hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b) offer an initial
indication of how the model of family firm stakeholder salience operates. These
hypotheses suggest that the relationship between each stakeholder group’s stakes and
performance will change depending on the type of performance measure used. In other
words, if the stakes of a stakeholder group are positively related to economic
performance then they will be negatively related to non-economic performance. This
occurs due to the need for top management teams or decision makers to utilize resources
to meet the stakes of a number of stakeholders. Freeman’s (1984) seminal work
emphasizes this point by defining stakeholders as those individuals who can affect and/or
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are affected by the actions of the firm. Management must walk a fine line between these
competing groups so that neither economic nor non-economic performance is adversely
affected excessively. Again, as shown in Figure 2.3, stakes will have a direct affect on
the performance of the firm because meeting particular stakes of the stakeholders will
require the use of resources by the firm.
If performance is either economic or non-economic, then it is possible for an
action taken to meet a particular stake to positively influence one type of performance
and negatively affect the other. For instance, an individual who is a family member may
want to ensure all family members are provided company vehicles and fuel accounts as a
legitimate reward of family membership. This action would likely increase family
harmony because it would meet family stakes of receiving perquisites along with
benefiting from an adequate standard of living; these things consequently increase family
performance. On the other hand, this same action would decrease the bottom line for the
business in the short term, and reduce available funds for strategic actions or
reinvestment in the firm which may affect performance over the long term. Take note
that this does not imply that the company is less profitable. Instead, the company may be
just as profitable as non-family firms but profitability numbers would be inadvertently
reduced to pay for non-economic stakes of the family in the short term and this could lead
to problems for performance in the long term.
The most appropriate non-economic measure of performance available is the
Family Harmony scale developed by (Beehr, Drexler & Faulkner, 1997) where family
harmony is defined as the lack of conflict within the family firm. To date, alternative
scales measuring the performance specifically of the family have not been developed.
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Much of the literature on families and conflict have “focused on husband – wife relations
rather than harmony among family members more generally” (Beehr et al., 1997: 304).
The family harmony scale is appropriate because, as shown in the discussion of conflict
in the family firm, these businesses are rife with conflict and it is this conflict which often
times causes the decline and eventual death of the company. This dissertation argues that
conflict has the potential to arise when family firms pursue non-economic stakes too
often which diverts resources away from the achievement of economic stakes. Therefore,
instead of family harmony leading to increased economic performance, this scale is used
to show that the lack of conflict in the family system of the family firm may come at the
detriment of economic performance.
As discussed previously, the ownership group in the family firm possesses
multiple stakes that are primarily driven by economic factors (Gersick et al., 1997).
Owners of firms typically have a large portion of their own net worth invested in the
business and therefore they carry substantial amounts of risk (Fiegener et al., 2000b).
Basic financial analysis describes the relationship between risk and return as one that is
highly and positively correlated. Therefore, owners of firms expect financial productivity
through sales, profits, return on investment, etc. to be relatively high in comparison to the
risk associated with ownership.
Owners may see the long-term success of the business as an opportunity to
maintain their status and control (Gersick et al., 1997; Mintzberg, 1984). Success should
be directly related to the actions taken by the upper management to meet the needs of
owners. So, if ownership stakes are considered economically driven and economic
performance is affected by the actions of top management to meet the needs of the
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owners, then one would expect a positive relationship to exist between ownership stakes
and economic performance measures. From a different standpoint though, ownership
stakes would be expected to have a negative relationship with non-economic performance
measures. The negative relationship would arise when the stakes of owners reduce the
ability of the family stakeholder group to use resources to meet their own ends. This will
increase the level of perceived conflict within the family and thus will reduce the family’s
success by decreasing their level of family harmony.
So, this dissertation argues that ownership stakes are geared primarily towards
economic concerns and it is this focus on economic issues that would be beneficial to
measures of economic performance and negative towards non-economic performance.
Owners will use their influence to have their stakes satisfied and this satisfaction could
have long term effects on the success of the business (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Consequently, the first two hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 1a: The stakes of the ownership stakeholder group will be positively
related to economic performance.
Hypotheses 1b: The stakes of the ownership stakeholder group will be negatively
related to non-economic performance.
Hypothesis 1c and hypothesis 1d represent the salience of the ownership group
within the family firm. The ownership group in the family firm clearly possesses
centralized power that may or may not be utilized (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1997). The
owners’ monetary claims on the firm also afford them the legitimacy and power
necessary to force their will upon decision makers (Agle et al., 1999). Since the family
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firm often times has an overlap of owners, family, and management, the owner of the
firm may also have sole authority to make decisions (Gersick et al., 1997).
This dissertation argues that the level of ownership salience will affect the amount
of attention given to the stakes of owners by those making decision. If ownership stakes
are positively related to economic performance and negatively related to non-economic
performance, then intuitively an assumption can be made that higher ownership salience
will further enhance the positive relationship between ownership stakes and economic
performance. Also, it will further enhance the negative relationship between ownership
stakes and non-economic performance. Again, this has been shown in Figure 2.1 as a
relationship where stakes have direct affects on both types of performance measures and
the salience of the stakeholder groups moderate that relationship. Consequently, the next
two hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 1c: The salience of the ownership stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between ownership stakes and economic performance, where higher
ownership salience will further increase economic performance.
Hypothesis 1d: The salience of the ownership stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between ownership stakes and non-economic performance, where
higher ownership salience will further decrease non-economic performance.
In the proposed model, Hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b are the antithesis of
Hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b. As shown in the literature, the family stakeholder
group is primarily concerned with non-economic stakes (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005;
Sharma et al., 1997). The family group seeks to provide financial security to family
members, to maintain the family’s reputation in the community through community
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activism and civic duties, and to provide employment opportunities for family members
(Chrisman et al., 2003c; Lansberg, 1983; Riordan & Riordan, 1993). Each of these
stakes has the possibility of reducing funds available for reinvestment in the business in
the short term and hence may reduce economic performance measures.
The stakes of the family firm are expected to have a positive relationship with the
non-economic performance measure of family harmony (Beehr et al., 1997). The
relationship between non-economic performance and family stakes is derived from the
idea that family members receiving resources from the business to meet their stakes, due
to their family status, will possess lower levels of relationship conflict (Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007; Simons & Peterson, 2000) and this reduction in relationship conflict
will lead to harmony within the family. Family members find the family business
environment to be a much more peaceful place to work than elsewhere when their stakes
are being met (Kets de Vries, 1993). Actions such as hiring family members as
employees, spending money on family outings and other perks, providing education and a
high standard of living to family members, etc. will all contribute to the harmony found
within the family, but at the same time will reduce the amount of funds available for
reinvestment in the business. This again creates a situation where meeting the needs of
this particular stakeholder group will cause one performance measure to increase while
causing the other to decrease. Consequently, the next two hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 2a: The stakes of the family stakeholder group will be negatively
related to economic performance.
Hypothesis 2b: The stakes of the family stakeholder group will be positively
related to non-economic performance.
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Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d follow the previous illustration of the
relationship between ownership salience and ownership stakes upon both economic and
non-economic performance. The level of salience possessed by the family stakeholder
group will enhance the positive effect of family stakes upon non-economic performance
and will enhance the negative effect of family stakes upon economic performance. The
family stakeholder group is expected to have a relatively high level of salience within
most types of family firms because of their powerful and legitimate status within the
company (Gersick et al., 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997). Also, family firms have been
shown to possess high levels of altruism which may affect the perceived level of salience
held by family members (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2002). It is possible that the needs
of the family will not be urgent at particular times during the simultaneous development
of the family and the business. This is especially true when compared to the urgency of
owners’ economic stakes of profitability during the start-up phase of the business
(Mitchell et al., 1997). During this time, perks for the family may not be as important.
Nevertheless, when family members are considered highly salient in the minds of
decision makers, their stakes will be adhered to as much as possible. Otherwise, the
family may decide to withhold resources which could accordingly constrain firm
operations and severely affect the firm’s ability to operate. Consequently, the next two
hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 2c: The salience of the family stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between family stakes and economic performance, where higher
family salience will further decrease economic performance.
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Hypothesis 2d: The salience of the family stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between family stakes and non-economic performance, where higher
family salience will further increase non-economic performance.
Finally, this dissertation argues that the stakes for management have a negative
relationship with both performance measures. As outlined in the literature review,
management stakes include a good work environment for employees, monetary issues
such as competitive salary and benefits packages along with being ensured that those who
contribute to firm profit are rewarded regardless of family affiliation (Gersick et al.,
1997; Lansberg, 1983; Van der Heyden et al., 2005). Also important are opportunities
for advancement within the firm due to work output rather than family affiliation (Barnett
& Kellermanns, 2006), and finally to have a firm that has sustained long-term growth.
The stakes outlined above show that the management stakeholder group may have
a hodgepodge of claims on the firm. This dissertation argues that adhering to the claims
of management that are economically based will reduce economic performance because
taking actions such as increasing employees’ salaries and benefits will, at least in the
short run, reduce the bottom line. Also, by promoting within the firm those individuals
who may not be family or owners could increase the level of relationship conflict
between family members and workers along with increasing conflict of the family with
the business.
Additionally, family firm research has shown that equal distribution of benefits
for family members, regardless of equal input to the business, is highly valued (e.g., Van
der Heyden et al., 2005). This implies that family members expect to be compensated for
their status in the family even if it is at the detriment of the business and non-family
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employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). Thus, adhering to the procedural and
distributive justice claims of management would be in conflict with family stakes.
Therefore, by meeting the stakes of managers, the firm could both decrease the bottom
line and cause conflict within the family. This in turn would adversely affect the level of
family harmony found in the firm and reduce profitability. Consequently, the next two
hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 3a: The stakes of the management stakeholder group will be
negatively related to economic performance.
Hypothesis 3b: The stakes of the management stakeholder group will be
negatively related to non-economic performance.
The last two hypotheses follow the argument presented previously for the
moderating effect of salience on stakes / performance relationships. If the management
group of stakeholders possesses a high level of salience, then their stakes will be adhered
to over those of the owners and family. As this salience increases, so to does the negative
relationship between management stakes and economic and non-economic performance.
Therefore, the final two hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 3c: The salience of the management stakeholder group will moderate
the relationship between management stakes and economic performance, where
higher management salience will further decrease economic performance.
Hypothesis 3d: The salience of the management stakeholder group will moderate
the relationship between management stakes and non-economic performance,
where higher management salience will further decrease non-economic
performance.
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Summary
The present chapter developed a conceptual model to be analyzed using a sample
of family firms. The primary purpose of the model is to illustrate the effects of
stakeholder relationships upon decision makers and how the influence of stakeholders
and their stakes affects family firm performance. Specifically, the stakes of the three
primary stakeholder groups in family firms are described as having varying effects upon
two different types of firm performance. The model goes on to describe how the salience
of stakeholder groups affects the relationship between stakes and performance. Little
work has been done that brings together stakeholder theory and family business research
in such a way that allows for testing of new models and relationships between major
constructs of the two fields. The development of the Family Firm Stakeholder Salience
Model in this chapter has tried to accomplish this goal.
As the literature was reviewed, it was noted that the stakeholder theory literature
had recently begun to describe stakeholder salience and its effects upon the performance
of the firm. Also, it was discussed that conceptualizing the relationship between salience
and performance as direct in nature, and yet finding no significant results when tested
empirically, provided the basis for the development of the new model. Consequently, the
variable of stakes was introduced into the model and arguments ensued that contend this
variable directly affects performance while salience of stakeholder groups only indirectly
affects performance through the relationship of stakes and performance.
The development of this model not only presents an extension of the work by
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) and Agle and colleagues (1999), but it is also provides a
new way to utilize Gersick et al.’s (1997) three-circle model of the family firm to
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describe family business relationships. The three-circle model is drawn upon to isolate
the primary stakeholders in the family firm. Once isolated, each group’s stakes were
described and a case was made for their influence on firm performance.
Additionally, the family firm literature suggested that performance in the family
firm should be conceptualized differently if researchers are to accurately capture it.
Family firms possess both economic and non-economic stakes, and therefore
performance should be assessed upon each of these measures. It was argued that the noneconomic performance of family firms could be measured by the level of family harmony
exhibited in the firm. This was based upon literature from both stakeholder theory and
the family firm that suggested family firms are rife with conflict derived from meeting
family members’ stakes rather than the stakes of owners or managers. So, the model
developed in this chapter also presents a different way to measure performance in family
firms and utilizes the family harmony as a means to this end.
By bringing together stakeholder salience and the three-circle model of family
business, this research may now be able to better describe the reciprocal relationships
within family firms and their affects on the success of the business and the success of the
family. Utilizing stakeholder theory in this way may provide a more appropriate lens to
describe how relationships within family firms are developed over time, through each of
the stages of development for owners, family, and the business. This research also has the
potential to fill the gaps in the literature concerning how family businesses decide to
allocate effort, attention, and funds across stakeholder groups during these developmental
stages.
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A research methodology outlining the empirical examination of the model is
presented in the following chapter.

74

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used in this
dissertation. In particular, there are three sections. First, the research design section
discusses the source of data, the unit of analysis, and the sample selection. Second, the
measures used in the study are described. These are grouped into dependent,
independent, moderating, and control variables. This is preceded by a section describing
issues of validity when using previously validated scales for new studies and by a section
describing the development of new scales for this study. Finally, a discussion of the data
analysis procedures to be utilized will conclude this chapter.

Research Design
Research design in family firm studies increased in specificity and rigor as the
field developed over the last few decades. As with most social science topics, the study
of family firms has been conducted through many different quantitative and qualitative
methods with a major portion of those studies acquiring data from a survey or
questionnaire. The primary purpose of the analysis was to assess the relationship
between the dependent variables, economic and non-economic performance, with the
independent variables, ownership stakes, family stakes, and management stakes. Further,
the analysis assessed the effect of the moderating variables, ownership, family
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and management salience, on the relationships between the independent and dependent
variables.
This dissertation used a telephone survey and a cross sectional design to test the
relationships hypothesized in Chapter 2. A cross-sectional design was considered
appropriate for this study because the stakes of the stakeholder groups, and their salience,
are not likely to vary much over the period analyzed. Although appropriate, the use of a
cross-sectional design makes it difficult to account for common methods variance unless
multiple sources are utilized to collect data on the respondents (e.g., Lindell & Whitney,
2001). To avoid this confound, performance data was also collected from an external
source. Conducting analyses with this type of research design allows for conclusions
about causality (Nauta & Kluwer, 2004).

Sample
Family business data collected via a telephone survey was utilized to test the
hypotheses developed in this study. Data collection was sponsored by Laird Norton Tyee
(LNTyee) of Seattle, WA, who outsourced the data collection to Hebert Research, Inc.
The sample was obtained by purchasing a list containing family business contacts and
basic information from Dun & Bradstreet for the states of Washington, Idaho, and
Oregon in the United States of America. Utilization of Dun and Bradstreet as a data
source was deemed appropriate for several reasons. Dun and Bradstreet is the world’s
leading source of commercial business information, has been in operation for well over
100 years, and has a database containing more than 130 million business records (2008:
http://www.dnb.com/us/about/index.html). These records include names of owners,
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members of boards, industry designation, location, years of operation, firm size variables,
and numerous performance measures, all of which could be used to select and control for
different types of family firms. Also, Dun and Bradstreet databases have been used often
as a source of data for mainstream management topics including venture growth’s
relationship with entrepreneurial traits (Baum & Locke, 2004), work/family programs
(Osterman, 1995), empirical tests of the resource based view (Ray, Barney & Muhanna,
2004), and investigating the effects of different definitions for family firms on their
volume and scope in England (Westhead & Cowling, 1998), etc.
To aid in the selection of family businesses, the sample consisted only of those
companies that listed at least two officers or directors with the same last name. Also, the
opening narrative and initial questions made it clear that the study was for family
businesses only and that subjects should be individuals that were members of the family
who had management or ownership control of the firm. Decision makers were
considered appropriate respondents concerning the scales utilized because the decision
maker’s interpretation of stakes and stakeholder salience is assumed to influence decision
making and consequently, performance.
Businesses were contacted via telephone over a three week period. Respondents
were called up to three times (Dillman, 2000) to increase the sample size and simple ttests were conducted to compare the initial respondents with later respondents to ensure
there were no significant differences between them. Also, simple t-tests were conducted
between those respondents and non-respondents to ensure there were no significant
differences between these groups. To attain acceptable power of 0.80 (Magid, Mazen,
Hemmasi & Lewis, 1987) for the multiple regression analysis with a medium effect size
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(Cohen, 1988) and an alpha of 0.05, a power analysis conducted utilizing G*Power
software determined that it was necessary to have at least 150 completed surveys. By
having an adequate amount of power in the test, it was ensured that the probability of a
Type II error was minimized.
The original sample size was 2,494 firms. Of the 2,494 firms, 298 firms (11.9%)
had either non-working phone numbers (202), incorrect phone numbers (71), or were on
a national do-not-call list (25). Also, 183 firms (7.3%) had only one family member
working in the business, 27 firms (1.1%) did not have a decision-maker available for
response to the survey, and 94 firms (3.8%) were found to be not applicable to the study
upon answering the initial questions. A large percentage of the firms refused to answer
the survey (673 firms; 27.0%) and 53 firms (2.1%) were out of business. Once the
surveys were completed, those firms which had previous year’s sales of less than
$100,000 were deleted. This action was taken to ensure that the final sample was of
enough size to include firms that could be considered professionalized and who would
have enough employees to be able to truly examine the relationships between each of the
primary stakeholder groups.
Of the remaining firms, 210 firms completed the survey for an overall response
rate of (8.4%). Due to some surveys not being fully completed, a case-wise deletion
method was utilized during each regression analyses which resulted in the smallest
useable sample being 152 firms (6.1%) and the largest being 168 firms (6.7%).
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Measures

Issues of Validity
Both previously developed and new scales were used in this study. A full copy of
the survey instrument can be found in the Appendix. The eleven point Likert-type
response categories of “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree” were employed for all
scales. This created continuity between the different scales and reduced the difficulty of
respondents in understanding the survey’s directions (DeVellis, 2003). In this study,
expert judges assessed the face and content validity (Spector, 1992) of the items.
Refinements were made where necessary to ensure that the questions would be
understandable to the target population. In the case of new scales being developed for
this particular study, several steps described by Churchill (1979) and DeVellis (2003)
concerning new scale development and issues of validity were followed including testing
for face, content, and construct validity.

Dependent Variables
Economic Performance. As described previously, the performance of the family
firm from an economic standpoint is often used in family firm research. In this study,
economic performance was determined by asking respondents to assess their profitability
as compared to their major competitors. Respondents were also asked to assess their
sales growth as compared to their major competitors. Both measures were assessed with
the Likert-type scale described above. The latter measure of economic performance was
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used as a post hoc analysis to validate the results of the former performance measure and
since the results were similar they were not presented in this dissertation.
Non-economic Performance. Multiple family firm studies have been predicated
upon the idea that conflict often arises from the intersection of ownership, family, and
management systems and that it is this conflict that may cause major rifts in the
communication and effectiveness of leaders of the firm. Conflict may arise because
family businesses have non-economic goals and the achievement of those goals affect
decision making. Also, conflict has been a primary characteristic of all firms when
described by stakeholder theorists. Therefore, an assessment of conflict in the family
firm was chosen as a way to understand the performance of these firms from a noneconomic standpoint. To assess the level of conflict in this sample the Family Harmony
Scale, previously developed and tested by Beehr, Drexler, and Faulkner (1997), was
utilized as a measure of non-economic performance. This four-item scale, shown to have
reliability (α ) of 0.87 (Beehr et al., 1997), was slightly altered for this study. The items
for this scale were the following:
1. The family members who control the business seem to get along with each
other better than most families do.
2. People in the controlling family agree with each other on most issues.
3. People in the controlling family are very compatible with each other.
4. The controlling family members almost never argue with each other.
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Independent Variables
Stakes. To assess the stakes of owners, family members, and managers, three
five-item scales were developed specifically for this study. Scale items were created
from previous literature that focused on the goals, stakes, or interests of each of the three
groups in question (e.g., Beckhard & Dyer, 1983a; Birch, 1987; Chrisman et al., 2003a;
Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily & Dollinger, 1992a; Fiegener et al., 2000b; Gersick et al.,
1997; Lansberg, 1983; Mintzberg, 1984; Riordan & Riordan, 1993; Sharma et al., 1997;
Taguiri & Davis, 1982; Van der Heyden et al., 2005). This literature was thoroughly
reviewed in Chapter 2 and the scale development process was described above. Each of
the five- item scales’ questions are listed below:

Ownership Stakes
1. The long term financial success of the business is very important to the owners of the

company.
2. Having a highly profitable business is very important to the owners of the company.
3. Maintaining ownership control of the business is very important to the owners of the
company.
4. The long-term growth of the business is very important to the owners of the company.
5. A high return on investment is very important to the owners of the company.

Family Stakes
1. Providing employment for family members is very important to the family.
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2. Maintaining the reputation of the family members in the community is very important
to the family.
3. Providing financial security to individual family members is very important to the
family.
4. Continued family member involvement in the management of the business is very
important to the family.
5. Having a highly profitable business is very important to the family.

Management Stakes
1. A good work environment is very important to the managers of the firm.
2. A competitive salary and benefits package is very important to the managers of the
firm.
3. An opportunity for career advancement is very important to the individual managers of
the firm.
4. Ensuring that those who contribute to firm profit are compensated accordingly is very
important to the individual managers of the firm.
5. The long-term growth of the business is very important to the individual managers of
the firm.

Moderating Variables
Salience. Three salience constructs were used to test for moderation of the
relationships between the independent stakes variables and both economic and noneconomic performance. Each of these salience constructs was derived from Agle et al.
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(1999). The original scale from Agle et al. (1999) consisted of three items. The three
previously developed items were altered to reflect the ownership, management, and
family stakeholder groups. Also, a fourth item was developed to ensure that enough
items loaded onto the construct during exploratory factor analysis. Each of the four-item
scales’ questions are listed below with the newly developed item last:

Ownership Salience
1. The wishes of the owners receive high priority from our top management team.
2. The needs of the owners receive a high degree of time and attention from our top
management team.
3. Satisfying the claims of the owners is very important to our top management team.
4. The goals of the owners influence the decision making processes of our top
management team.

Family Salience
1. The wishes of the family members receive high priority from our top management
team.
2. The needs of the family members receive a high degree of time and attention from our
top management team.
3. Satisfying the claims of the family members is very important to our top management
team.
4. The goals of the family members influence the decision making processes of our top
management team.
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Management Salience
1. The wishes of individual managers receive high priority from our top management
team.
2. The needs of the managers of the firm receive a high degree of time and attention from
our top management team.
3. Satisfying the claims of the individual managers is very important to our top
management team.
4. The individual goals of the managers influence the decision making processes of our
top management team.

Control Variables
Several basic control measures were utilized in this study. Following previous
studies (i.e., Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-Marin, 2007; Hienerth & Kessler, 2006),
firm size, industry, and age of the firm were controlled. Firm size was controlled for with
the previous year’s sales for each firm. Industry SIC codes were used to categorize each
of the firms in the sample into their respective industries, which included (1) Retail,
Wholesale, Restaurant, and Hotel (2) Manufacturing, and (3) Personal Services. Firm
age was assessed by asking the respondent “In what year was the business established?”
The year was then subtracted from the year in which the survey was administered to
determine firm age. Assessing firm age is particularly important in this study because it
will allow assessment of the stage of development that the family business may be in as
outlined by Gersick and colleagues (1997). The respondent’s role in the business was
also controlled. The respondent’s role in the business was based on whether or not the
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individual was a (1) Founder/CEO or (2) not a Founder/CEO but still a decision maker in
the controlling family.
The data analysis also controlled for ownership characteristics of the business
because different ownership structures may have various effects on decision making
processes. Following previous research, the ownership characteristics controlled
included the number of owners of the business and the ownership percentage by the
controlling family. To control for the different stages of family development, the number
of family members involved in the business and the number of potential successors
available from the controlling family were included as control variables.

Data Analysis
The most appropriate statistical technique to test the hypotheses and model
developed herein is hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression
analysis assesses the amount of variability of a dependent variable by using information
from one or more independent variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995).
Initially, the major assumptions of regression were tested (Kutner, Neter, Nachtsheim &
Li, 2004). Then, using the two dependent variables, separate multiple regression models
were tested to ascertain the effects from the independent, moderator, and control
variables. SPSS 16.0 was used to conduct these tests. The models proceeded in the
following order: control variables were entered first, followed by the independent
variables, moderator variables, and then the interaction of the independent and moderator
variables. To isolate the effects of each of the stakeholder groups, the regression models
were also run by only entering the independent, moderator, and interaction term for each
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stakeholder group in separate analyses. This reduced the number of variables present in
the models which offered more power to the tests.

Preliminary testing procedures
Testing Scales. Exploratory factor analysis through a principle components
analysis procedure was utilized to reduce the number of variables which reflected the
proposed constructs in this study. Principle components analysis was chosen due to its
widespread use in the field of management along with its appropriateness when trying to
reduces a large number of items to several common factors. Common factor analysis
rather than principle components analysis was considered because common factor
analysis has the potential to provide more precise evaluations when reducing variables to
factors by first relaxing the assumption that the variables measured lack error and second
by offering a rotation technique that allows factors to be correlated (Chadwick, Barnett &
Dwyer, 2008; Gorsuch, 1990; Hair et al., 1995). Unfortunately common factor analysis
was unable to adequately separate the items from each other.
Next, issues regarding items cross-loading onto more than one factor were
addressed by using a varimax rotation procedure and dropping those items when the
rotation did not correct cross-loadings (Hair et al., 1995). Finally, all scales were tested
for reliability by computing Cronbach’s alpha. Once all factors were adequately
established, all scales were summated into individual variables. Additionally, common
method bias was assessed since a single respondent rated stakes, salience, and
performance. Harmon’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) was utilized to make
sure common methods bias was not present. A single factor did not emerge and therefore
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one factor did not account for most of the variance. These results suggest that the
perceptive data and performance measures were not affected by common methods bias
through use of a single source.
Moderation/Interaction Issues. To test for the effect of stakeholder salience on
the relationship between stakes and performance, interaction variables were computed by
multiplying each stakeholder group’s salience variable with its corresponding stakes
variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The original salience variables were entered into the
regression equation to assess the possibility of direct effects on the dependent variables.
Then, each of the interaction variables were entered into the final model.
Due to issues with multicollinearity, all variables were first centered and then zscores were calculated. Following this procedure, the interaction terms were once again
calculated. At this point, the models were rerun and multicollinearity was assessed. Due
to these changes all variables in the equations were found to be at or below acceptable
levels (Aiken & West, 1991).
To find the true effect of moderation on the nature of the relationships between
the independent and the dependent variables, it was necessary to plot graphs depicting the
slopes of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables at different
levels of the moderating variables (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006). The
slopes were plotted at the mean level, once standard deviation above its mean, and one
standard deviation below its mean. Once plotted, the slopes were tested for significant
differences between them. A Microsoft Excel 2007 worksheet developed by Jeremy
Dawson was utilized to perform these analyses (Dawson, 2006).
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Conclusions
This chapter has described the source of data and its sampling frame, a detailed
description of the measures along with a discussion of validity issues, and the techniques
use to analyze the data. The research methodology described above will provide a
roadmap to explain how the empirical test of the models will be conducted. By using a
newly collected data set, this research will offer the most up to date view of the
relationships found within the confines of family firms. The results of this empirical
analysis will be presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present results of analyses conducted to test the
hypotheses brought forth in Chapter II. First presented is a detailed description of data
collected from the sample of 210 family firms in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho in the
United States. This includes a review of sample characteristics with descriptive statistics
and correlations. Second, results of the common factor analyses used to create summated
factors for the independent and moderator variables are presented. Third, results of the
multiple regression models with both economic and non-economic performance are
presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings.

Sample Characteristics
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the final sample. Summated
scales, later described in the Table 4.2, are shown in this table for parsimony. The family
firms in this dissertation were primarily owned by the family (µ = 98.54%). The firms
were adequately diverse with the smallest industry grouping conducting personal services
(23.0%). More than half of the firms (µ = 6.46 of 10) consider themselves highly
profitable as compared to their competitors, and the average previous year’s sales was
slightly more than $1 million.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name
Profitable Compared to
Competitors
Family Harmony
Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry:
Manufacturing/Construction
Industry:
Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Ownership Stakes
Ownership Salience
Family Stakes
Family Salience
Management Stakes
Management Salience

N

Min

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

192
199

0
2.75

10
10

6.46
8.28

2.54
1.48

210
205

100,000
1

24,543,705
118

1,033,209
27.10

2,615,130.90
21.97

210

0

1

0.27

0.44

210
210
207
209
208
205
210
205
189
203
188
186
184

0
0
2
1
48
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

1
1
9
9
100
14
1
10
10
10
10
10
10

0.38
0.23
2.44
2.27
98.54
1.80
0.70
9.07
8.89
8.38
8.59
8.38
8.73

0.49
0.42
1.23
1.19
7.80
1.91
0.46
1.49
1.60
1.78
1.91
1.96
1.73

Table 4.2 presents the results of the principle components analysis of the
independent variables family harmony, ownership salience, ownership stakes, family
salience, family stakes, management salience, and management stakes (Note: descriptions
for survey items in Table 4.2 are listed in Table 4.3). All items associated with Family
Harmony, Ownership Salience, Family Salience, and Management Salience loaded onto
their respective constructs. Two items each from Ownership Stakes, Family Stakes, and
Management Stakes were deleted because the items either cross-loaded onto multiple
constructs or did not load on any construct (Note: descriptions for the survey items that
were dropped are listed in Table 4.4). After taking these steps, seven distinct scales
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remained, all of which possessed items with factor loadings above 0.40 with the smallest
being 0.49. This result illustrates that the individual items were adequately correlated
with their corresponding factors (Hair et al., 1995). Each factor had an eigenvalue of
greater than 1.0, which implies each contributed to the analysis. Common method bias
was assessed since a single respondent rated stakes, salience, and performance variables.
Harmon’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) was utilized to make sure common
methods bias was not present. The assumption of Harmon’s one-factor test is that if
common methods bias has an effect on the data, then one factor will emerge from the
factor analysis or one factor will account for the majority of the covariance in the
dependent and independent variables. A single factor did not emerge from the unrotated
factor solutions. Also, the first factor was able to explain 13.45% of the variance in the
data and the total variance explained by the seven-factor structure was 69.11%. These
results suggest that the perceptive data and performance measures were not affected by
common methods bias through use of a single source.
Further confirmation of the seven-factor structure was found by reviewing a scree
plot. A scree plot graphically depicts the fraction of the total variance in the data as
explained by each factor (Hair et al., 1995). The scree plot showed that the 7th factor was
the last factor to include enough common variance to be acceptable for extraction from
the data. Finally, Table 4.2 also presents the reliability, or internal consistency, of each
factor. Cronbach alphas are shown in bold at the bottom of the table. Each factor
exhibited an alpha above 0.70 except for Family Stakes, which had an alpha of 0.68, and
therefore the factors meet Hair et al.’s (1995) minimum level of 0.60 to 0.70.
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Q23E
Q23F
Q23G
Q23H
Q24A
Q24B
Q24C
Q24D
Q25A
Q25B
Q25C
Q25D
Q26A
Q26B
Q26C
Q26D
Q24E
Q24G
Q24H
Q25E
Q25F
Q25G
Q26F
Q26G
Q26I
Alpha
0.81

FAM. HARM.
0.79
0.81
0.84
0.75

0.94

0.85
0.87
0.80
0.82

OWN. SAL.

0.93

0.82
0.49
0.78
0.82

FAM. SAL.

0.95

0.86
0.82
0.88
0.84

MGT. SAL.

0.70

0.59
0.71
0.59

OWN. STA.

0.68

0.81
0.54
0.62

FAM. STA.

Factor Analysis – Principle Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation

Table 4.2

0.68
0.70
0.58
0.80

MGT. STA.
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23 F People in the controlling family agree with each other on most issues.
23 G People in the controlling family are VERY compatible with each other.
23 H The controlling family members almost NEVER argue with each other.
Ownership Salience
24 A The wishes of the owners receive HIGH priority from our top management team.
24 B The needs of the owners receive a HIGH degree of time and attention from our top management team.
24 C Satisfying the claims of the owners is very important to our top management team.
24 D The goals of the owners influence the decision making processes of our top management team.
Family Salience
25 A The wishes of the family members receive HIGH priority from our top management team.
The needs of the family members receive a HIGH degree of time and attention from our top
25 B management team.
25 C Satisfying the claims of the family members is very important to our top management team.
The goals of the family members influence the decision making processes of our top management
25 D team.
Management Salience
26 A The wishes of individual managers receive HIGH priority from our top management team.
The needs of the managers of the firm receive a HIGH degree of time and attention from our top
26 B management team.
26 C Satisfying the claims of the individual managers is very important to our top management team.
The individual goals of the managers influence the decision making processes of our top management
26 D team.

Family Harmony
The family members who control the business seem to get along with each other better than most
23 E families do.

Factor Analysis Question Key – Descriptions of Questions That Were Not Dropped

Table 4.3
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Ownership Stakes
24 F Having a highly profitable business is very important to the owners of the company.
24 I
A high return on investment is very important to the owners of the company.
Family Stakes
25 H Continued family member involvement in the management of the business is very important to the family.
25 I
Having a highly profitable business is very important to the family.
Management Stakes
26 E A good work environment is very important to the managers of the firm.
26 H Ensuring that those who contribute to firm profit are compensated accordingly is very important to the individual managers of the firm.

Factor Analysis Question Key – Descriptions of Questions That Were Dropped

Table 4.4

Ownership Stakes
24 E The long term financial success of the business is very important to the owners of the company.
24 G Maintaining ownership control of the business is very important to the owners of the company.
24 H The long-term growth of the business is very important to the owners of the company.
Family Stakes
25 E Providing employment for family members is very important to the family.
25 F Maintaining the reputation of the family members in the community is very important to the family.
25 G Providing financial security to individual family members is very important to the family
Management Stakes
26 F A competitive salary and benefits package is very important to the managers of the firm.
26 G An opportunity for career advancement is very important to the individual managers of the firm.
26 I
The long-term growth of the business is very important to the individual managers of the firm.

Factor Analysis Question Key – Descriptions of Questions That Were Not Dropped

Table 4.3 continued

Table 4.5 presents the correlations for the variables used in the study. Summated
scales are again presented rather than individual items for parsimony. Also, the
correlation table was created by utilizing mean replacement procedures since not all
surveys were responded to in full. Mean replacement was deemed necessary so that all
regression analyses would be conducted using the same sample size. Therefore, the
correlation matrix is consistent for all regression equations subsequently presented and
the consistency in sample size allows for more appropriate comparisons of the results.
To ensure that mean replacement did not arbitrarily inflate or skew results, the correlation
analysis and all regression analyses were also conducted using listwise deletion of cases.
Listwise deletion excludes cases that do not have data on all variables in the variables list
and effectively reduces the sample size. The results of the hypotheses presented in
Chapter II were similar when utilizing both methods. Therefore, for the sake of
comparison of results from the mean regression analyses, mean replacement results are
described in this dissertation.
The correlation matrix provides evidence regarding the strong relationships that
existed between certain variables and thus provides a preliminary assessment of how the
variables interact in this data set. Economic performance (profitable compared to
competitors) and non-economic performance (family harmony) were not significantly
correlated. Each of the stakes constructs was significantly correlated to economic
performance: Ownership Stakes at 0.20 (p<0.01), Family Stakes at 0.15 (p<0.05), and
Management Stakes at 0.29 (p<0.01). These correlations imply that adhering to the
stakes of all three primary stakeholder groups in family firms can positively influence
economic performance. This preliminary finding is counter to arguments set forth in
95

Chapter II concerning the relationship between economic performance and both family
and management stakeholder groups. Alternatively, significant correlations between
non-economic performance and Family Stakes (0.23; p<0.01) was consistent with
previous arguments.
Regression analyses were conducted first by isolating the effects of each
stakeholder group and then with analyses integrating all groups. This was done because
the stakes and salience variables possessed significant correlations with each other
(McGrath, 2001) and the influence of not only the original variables, but also the multiple
computed interaction variables could lead to spurious results. So, it was important to
know how the stakes and salience variables affect both types of performance when alone
and how they affect performance when all stakeholder groups were together.
Consistency between results from tests of the individual stakeholder groups and tests of
the combined stakeholder groups would be ideal.
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+

1

6.46
2.43
1.00
8.28
1.44
0.10
1,033,209.10 2,615,130.87 0.12
27.10
21.71 0.07
0.27
0.44
0.02
0.38
0.49 -0.16*
0.23
0.42
0.12
2.44
1.22
0.12
2.27
1.19
0.06
98.54
7.76
0.08
1.80
1.89
0.05
0.70
0.46
-0.09
9.07
1.47 0.20**
8.89
1.52
0.13
8.38
1.75
0.15*
8.59
1.81
0.14*
8.38
1.85 0.29**
8.73
1.62
0.12

Std. Dev.
1.00
-0.13
-0.06
0.01
-0.03
0.05
-0.11
0.00
0.01
-0.02
0.19**
0.12
0.34**
0.23**
0.29**
0.11
0.28**

2

p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

1. Profitable Compared to Competitors
2. Family Harmony
3. Sales Volume
4. Age of the Company
5. Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
6. Industy: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
7. Industry: Personal Services
8. # of Family FTEs
9. # of Owners
10. Percent Family Owned
11. # of Family potential successors
12. Dummy: Founder
13. Ownership Stakes
14. Ownership Salience
15. Family Stakes
16. Family Salience
17. Management Stakes
18. Management Salience

Mean

1.00
0.22**
-0.04
0.10
0.01
0.33**
0.12
-0.14*
0.05
-0.13
0.06
-0.03
-0.11
-0.06
0.06
-0.02

3

1.00
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.17*
0.19**
-0.09
0.12
-0.41**
-0.07
-0.02
0.09
-0.11
0.08
-0.02

4

1.00
-0.47**
-0.33**
0.22**
0.05
0.10
0.04
-0.01
0.12
-0.01
0.07
-0.03
0.08
-0.04

5

1.00
-0.43**
-0.05
0.01
-0.16*
-0.08
0.08
-0.18**
-0.08
-0.06
-0.10
-0.16*
-0.03

6

1.00
-0.05
-0.03
0.03
0.01
-0.12
0.10
0.10
0.07
0.12
0.09
0.07

7

Correlations

Table 4.5

1.00
0.36**
-0.08
0.21**
-0.10
0.17*
-0.09
0.03
-0.07
0.14*
-0.02

8

1.00
-0.41**
0.26**
-0.11
0.03
0.00
-0.05
0.05
0.04
-0.04

9

11

12

1.00
-0.02 1.00
-0.05 -0.10 1.00
0.00 0.01 -0.01
0.08 0.00 0.01
0.02 -0.13 0.05
-0.04 -0.15* 0.07
-0.02 -0.05 -0.08
0.02 0.00 0.01

10

1.00
0.21**
0.27**
0.38**
0.48**
0.15*

13

15

16

17

1.00
0.22** 1.00
0.60** 0.38** 1.00
0.29** 0.46** 0.42** 1.00
0.58** 0.25** 0.56** 0.37**

14

1.00

18

A second concern with including multiple interaction terms was the adverse
effects of multicollinearity that may arise. As discussed in Chapter III, all variables were
centered and then their Z-scores were computed to reduce the chance for multicollinearity
to obfuscate the results. In all of the regression models in this chapter, the Variance
Inflation Factor of any one variable never exceeded 2.65 and the Condition Index never
exceeded 2.75. These results are well within commonly acceptable ranges for
multicollinearity (Pedhazur, 1997).

Hypotheses Related to Economic Performance
Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 present the results of regression models used to test the
relationships between the three stakeholder groups and Economic Performance
(profitability compared to competitors). Therefore, these tables present results for tests of
H1a, H1c, H2a, H2c, H3a, and H3c. Each table presents four models used for
hierarchical regression analysis. In each table, Model 1, which included the control
variables only, was the base model. Model 2 added the stakes construct, Model 3 added
the salience construct, and finally Model 4 added the interaction term for stakes and
salience. The hierarchical regression analysis was organized in this manner so that it
could be ascertained if there was (1) a direct relationship between the stakes variables and
the dependent variable, (2) a continued relationship after the introduction of the salience
variable, and (3) a change in the relationship between stakes and the dependent variable
after introducing the interaction term, along with assessing the significance of the
interaction term (Aguinis, 2004; Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986).
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Table 4.6 presents results of the ownership stakeholder group regressed upon
economic performance. These analyses intended to test H1a and H1c. None of the
control variables entered in Model 1 was a significant predictor of economic performance
except for the industry dummy variable for Retail/Wholesale/Restaurant/Hotel. The
model was not significant and the control variables explained 2% (Adjusted R2) of the
variation in economic performance.
Model 2 resulted in a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the
regression model. The model was marginally significant (p<0.10) and explained 4%
(Adjusted R2) of the variation in economic performance. Furthermore, the change in R2
(0.02) was significant (p<0.05). The coefficient of Ownership Stakes (β = 0.16) was
significant (p<0.05) and in the hypothesized direction.
Model 3 introduced the Ownership Salience construct. There was no significant
change in R2 and the coefficient for Ownership Salience was not significant while
Ownership Stakes remained significant (β = 0.15; p<0.05).
Model 4 introduced the interaction term for Ownership Stakes and Ownership
Salience and this overall model was significant (p<0.01). The change in R2 was
significant (p<0.01) and Ownership Stakes remained positive and significant (β = 0.27;
p<0.001), which lends support for H1a. The coefficient for the interaction term was also
significant and positive (β = 0.25; p<0.01), lending support for H1c; ownership stakes
positively affected economic performance and when the ownership group was salient, the
relationship between ownership stakes and economic performance was strengthened.
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Table 4.6
Results of OLS Regression Using “Relative to our major competitors, our firm is very
profitable” (economic performance) as the Dependent Variable and Ownership
Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Ownership Stakes
Ownership Salience
Own. Stakes * Own. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
0.11
0.04
-0.09
-0.19+
0.00
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.00
-0.02

Model 2
Beta
0.10
0.06
-0.11
-0.18
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.11
0.00
-0.02
0.16*

Model 3
Beta
0.10
0.06
-0.11
-0.18
-0.01
0.05
0.07
0.11
0.00
-0.01
0.15*
0.03

1.42
0.07
0.07
0.02

1.76+
0.09
0.02*
0.04

1.63+
0.09
0.01
0.04

Model 4
Beta
0.10
0.03
-0.13
-0.19+
-0.03
0.05
0.06
0.10
0.01
0.00
0.27***
0.05
0.25**
2.30**
0.13
0.04**
0.08

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
As mentioned in Chapter III, to find the true effect of moderation on the nature of
the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables, it was necessary
to plot graphs depicting the slopes of the relationships between the independent and
dependent variables at different levels of the moderating variables (Aiken & West, 1991;
Dawson & Richter, 2006). H1c stated that the salience of the ownership stakeholder
group would moderate the positive relationship between ownership stakes and economic
performance, where higher ownership salience would further increase economic
performance. Figure 4.1 illustrates the linear relationship between ownership stakes and
economic performance. The stakes / performance relationship is shown by plotting it at
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three different points: one standard deviation below the mean (Low Ownership Stakes),
the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean (High Ownership Stakes). Also,
the stakes / performance relationship is plotted along two different levels of Ownership
Salience, low versus high (created from coefficients found in Model 4 of Table 4.6).
Based on H1c, it was expected that the linear relationship depicted in Figure 4.1
would show an increase in economic performance as ownership stakes increase from
Low Ownership Stakes to High Ownership Stakes. As can be seen, the positive stakes /
performance relationship holds true for both high and low levels of ownership salience,
but when a firm possesses high salience for its ownership group, the linear effect of
ownership stakes upon economic performance was much more pronounced. When
Ownership Stakes were low, economic performance was virtually the same no matter the
level of salience of the ownership group. But, when ownership salience was high,
economic performance was much higher than when ownership salience was low. In other
words, as salience for the ownership group increased so too did the positive effect of
ownership stakes on economic performance.
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Figure 4.1
Ownership Interaction with only Ownership Stakeholders Included in the Analysis and
Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable
Table 4.7 presents the results of the family stakeholder group’s variables
regressed upon economic performance and thus tests relationships set forth by H2a and
H2c. Again, the industry dummy variable for Retail/Wholesale/Restaurant/Hotel entered
in Model 1 was moderately significant. The model was not significant and the control
variables explained 2% (Adjusted R2) of the variation in economic performance.
Model 2 resulted in a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the
regression model (Change in R2 = 0.03; p<0.05). Even though the change in R2 was
significant, the overall model was marginally significant (p<0.10). The coefficient of
Family Stakes (β = 0.16) was significant (p<0.05) but was not in the hypothesized
direction.
Model 3 introduced the Family Salience construct. This did not result in an
improvement to the model. Model 4 was marginally significant (p<0.10) but the change
in R2 was not significant. The coefficients for Family Stakes, Family Salience, and the
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interaction term were not significant predictors of economic performance. Therefore, this
results in a lack of support for H2a and H2c.
Table 4.7
Results of OLS Regression Using “Relative to our major competitors, our firm is very
profitable” (economic performance) as the Dependent Variable and Family
Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Family Stakes
Family Salience
Fam. Stakes * Fam. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
0.10
0.04
-0.09
-0.19+
0.00
0.07
0.07
0.10
0.00
-0.02

Model 2
Beta
0.13
0.02
-0.11
-0.20+
-0.02
0.06
0.07
0.11
0.02
-0.04
0.16*

Model 3
Beta
0.13
0.03
-0.10
-0.19+
-0.02
0.06
0.06
0.11
0.03
-0.03
0.13
0.10

1.42
0.07
0.07
0.02

1.81+
0.09
0.03*
0.04

1.80*
0.10
0.01
0.04

Model 4
Beta
0.13
0.03
-0.11
-0.19+
-0.02
0.06
0.05
0.11
0.04
-0.03
0.11
0.08
-0.07
1.71+
0.10
0.00
0.04

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table 4.8 presents results of the management stakeholder group’s variables
regressed upon economic performance and tests H3a and H3c. Of the control variables
entered in Model 1, only the industry dummy variable for
Retail/Wholesale/Restaurant/Hotel was a moderately significant predictor of economic
performance (β = -0.19; p<0.10). The model was not significant and the control variables
only explained 2% (Adjusted R2) of the variation in economic performance.
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Model 2 was significant (p<0.01) and the addition of Management Stakes resulted
in a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the regression model (change in
R2 = 0.06; p<0.001). Even so, the results of Model 2 do not provide preliminary support
for H3a because the coefficient of Management Stakes (β = 0.26) was highly significant
(p<0.001) but was not in the hypothesized direction.
Models 3 did not result in a significant improvement to the regression equation.
Management Salience was not significant and Management Stakes remained significant
and positive (β = 0.25; p<0.001). Model 4 added the Management interaction term.
Again, Management Stakes remained highly significant and positive (β = 0.27; p<0.001),
which did not lend support for H3a. The Management interaction was significant (β =
0.21; p<0.001), but was in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Thus, there was no
support for H3c.
Although it was not hypothesized, the interaction effect of Management Stakes
and Management Salience is graphically represented below in Figure 4.2. Similar to the
ownership stakeholder group, economic performance increased as management stakes
increased regardless of the level of salience the managers possessed. When the salience
of management was high the positive relationship between management stakes and
economic performance was much higher.
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Table 4.8
Results of OLS Regression Using “Relative to our major competitors, our firm is very
profitable” (economic performance) as the Dependent Variable and Management
Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Management Stakes
Management Salience
Mgt. Stakes * Mgt. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
0.11
0.04
-0.09
-0.19+
0.00
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.00
-0.02

Model 2
Beta
0.10
0.03
-0.08
-0.14
0.00
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.02
-0.01
0.26***

Model 3
Beta
0.10
0.03
-0.08
-0.14
0.00
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.02
-0.01
0.25***
0.03

1.42
0.07
0.07
0.02

2.64**
0.13
0.06***
0.08

2.42**
0.13
0.00
0.08

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Model 4
Beta
0.11
0.02
-0.09
-0.14
-0.03
0.04
0.07
0.11
0.01
-0.01
0.27***
0.11
0.21**
2.91***
0.16
0.03**
0.11

Figure 4.2
Management Interaction with only Management Stakeholders Included in the Analysis
and Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable

Hypotheses Related to Non-Economic Performance
Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 present results of regression models used to test
proposed relationships between the three stakeholder groups and Non-Economic
Performance (Family Harmony). Therefore, these tables present results for tests of H1b,
H1d, H2b, H2d, H3b, and H3d. The procedures for these analyses are identical to the
previous tests of economic performance. Please refer to the description of the
hierarchical analyses with economic performance as the dependent variable for further
detail.
Table 4.9 presents the results of the ownership stakeholder group’s variables
regressed upon non-economic performance and tests H1b and H1d. Model 1 was not
significant and the control variables explained 2% (Adjusted R2) of the variation in noneconomic performance. Of the control variables entered in Model 1, whether or not the
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respondent was a founder of the family firm (β = 0.20; p<0.01) was the only significant
predictor of non-economic performance.
Model 2 resulted in a significant improvement in the explanatory value of the
regression equation (change in R2 =0.02; p<0.05). The coefficient of Ownership Stakes
(β = 0.15) was significant (p<0.05) but was not in the hypothesized direction.
Ownership Salience was added to the regression equation in Model 3 and it
significantly improved the regression equation (change in R2 = 0.07; p<0.001). The
coefficient of Ownership Salience was highly significant (β = 0.28; p<0.001) and
Ownership Stakes were not significant.
Model 4 introduced the interaction term for Ownership Stakes and Ownership
Salience and this model was again significant yet no further explanatory power was
provided by the addition of the interaction term shown by a non-significant change in R2.
Ownership Stakes remained non-significant, lending no support for H1b. Ownership
Salience remained significant (β = 0.29; p<0.001). The Ownership interaction term was
not significant and therefore Model 4 did not lend support for H1d.
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Table 4.9
Results of OLS Regression Using “Family Harmony” (non-economic performance) as the
Dependent Variable and Ownership Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Ownership Stakes
Ownership Salience
Own. Stakes * Own. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
-0.10
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.11
-0.09
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.20**

Model 2
Beta
-0.11
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.09
-0.11
0.06
0.03
0.01
0.21**
0.15*

Model 3
Beta
-0.11
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.08
-0.06
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.20**
0.06
0.28***

1.33
0.06
0.06
0.02

1.66+
0.08
0.02*
0.03

2.99***
0.15
0.07***
0.10

Model 4
Beta
-0.11
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.07
-0.07
0.03
-0.01
0.00
0.20**
0.11
0.29***
0.10
2.90***
0.16
0.01
0.11

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table 4.10 presents results of the family stakeholder group’s variables regressed
upon non-economic performance and tests H2b and H2d. Of the control variables
entered in Model 1, whether or not the respondent was a founder of the family firm (β =
0.20; p<0.01) was the only significant predictor of non-economic performance. The
model was not significant and the control variables explained 2% (Adjusted R2) of the
variation in non-economic performance.
Model 2 resulted in a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the
regression model (Change in R2 = 0.04; p<0.01). The overall model was also significant
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(p<0.05) and the coefficient of Family Stakes was significant and in the hypothesized
direction (β = 0.22; p<0.01).
Model 3 introduced the Family Salience construct. There was a significant
change in R2 (0.04; p<0.01) and the coefficient of Family Salience was significant (β =
0.23; p<0.001). As a result of the inclusion of Family Salience, the variable Family
Stakes was only a moderately significant predictor of non-economic performance (β =
0.13; p<0.10)
Model 4 introduced the interaction term for Family Stakes and Family Salience
and this model was significant (p<0.001). The change in R2 was highly significant (0.06;
p<0.001) and Family Stakes (0.20; p<0.01) were significant. Therefore, family stakes
have a positive affect on family harmony, and thus H2b was supported. Family Salience
(0.29; p<0.001) was also a significant predictor of economic performance. Lastly, the
coefficient for the interaction term was significant and positive (β = 0.27; p<0.001),
lending support for H2d; family stakes positively affected family harmony and when
family members were salient the relationship between family stakes and family harmony
was strengthened.
H2d stated that the salience of the family stakeholder group would moderate the
positive relationship between family stakes and non-economic performance, where higher
family salience would further increase non-economic performance. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the linear relationship between family stakes and non-economic performance. Again, the
stakes / performance relationship is shown by plotting it at three different points: one
standard deviation below the mean (Low Family Stakes), the mean, and one standard
deviation above the mean (High Family Stakes). Also, the stakes / performance
109

relationship is plotted along two different levels of Family Salience, low versus high
(created from coefficients found in Model 4 of Table 4.10).
Table 4.10
Results of OLS Regression Using “Family Harmony” (non-economic performance) as the
Dependent Variable and Family Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Family Stakes
Family Salience
Fam. Stakes * Fam. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
-0.10
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.11
-0.09
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.20**

Model 2
Beta
-0.06
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.08
-0.11
0.07
0.02
0.04
0.18*
0.22**

Model 3
Beta
-0.07
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.08
-0.09
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.18*
0.13+
0.23**

1.33
0.06
0.06
0.02

2.15*
0.11
0.04**
0.06

2.88***
0.15
0.04**
0.10

Model 4
Beta
-0.07
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.08
-0.08
0.06
0.03
0.00
0.18*
0.20**
0.29***
0.27***
3.92***
0.21
0.06***
0.15

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Based on H2d, it was expected that the linear relationship depicted in Figure 4.2
would show an increase in non-economic performance as family stakes increase from
Low Family Stakes to High Family Stakes. Interestingly, the positive stakes /
performance relationship appears to only hold true when the salience of the family
stakeholder group was high. This result suggests that even when the stakes of the family
stakeholder group were considered very high, the effect on non-economic performance
was negligible at best if the salience of the family stakeholder group was low.
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Alternatively, the stakes / performance relationship was positive when there was high
salience for the family stakeholder group. In other words, as salience for the family
stakeholder group increased from low to high, non-economic performance increased
significantly. This result suggests that the salience of the family stakeholder group
played a very powerful part in the level of harmony reached by family members.

Figure 4.3
Family Interaction with only Family Stakes Included in the Analysis and Non-Economic
Performance as the Dependent Variable
Table 4.11 presents the results of the management stakeholder group’s variables
regressed upon non-economic performance and tests H3b and H3d. Model 1 added the
control variables. Again, whether or not the respondent was a founder of the business
was a moderately significant predictor of non-economic performance (β = 0.20; p<0.01).
The model was not significant and the control variables only explained 2% (Adjusted R2)
of the variation in non-economic performance.
Model 2 added Management Stakes to the regression equation and this was a
significant improvement (Change in R2 = 0.02; p<0.05). The coefficient for Management
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Stakes was significant (β = 0.14; p<0.05) but was in the opposite direction as
hypothesized. Even so, the overall model was not significant.
Model 3 was significant, there was a significant change in R2 (0.06; p<0.001), and
Management Salience was highly significant (β = 0.26; p<0.001).
The Management interaction term was added in Model 4. This overall model was
significant (p<0.01) and there was a significant change in R2 (0.04; p<0.01).
Management Stakes remained non-significant, which lends no support for H3b.
Management Salience was significant (β = 0.35; p<0.001). The Management interaction
term was significant (β = 0.23; p<0.01) but was in the opposite direction as hypothesized
and therefore Model 4 does not lend support to H3d.
Although it was not hypothesized, the interaction effect of Management Stakes
and Management Salience is graphically represented below in Figure 4.4. As shown,
non-economic performance increased as management stakes increased only in the cases
where the salience of management was high. When management salience was low,
increasing levels of management stakes resulted in lower levels of non-economic
performance. When the salience of management was high the positive relationship
between management stakes and economic non-performance was much higher.
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Table 4.11
Results of OLS Regression Using “Family Harmony” (non-economic performance) as the
Dependent Variable and Management Stakeholders

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Construction
Industry: Retail/Wholesale/Rest/Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Management Stakes
Management Salience
Mgt. Stakes * Mgt. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 1
Beta
-0.10
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.11
-0.09
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.20**

Model 2
Beta
-0.10
0.04
0.07
0.06
0.11
-0.11
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.21**
0.14*

Model 3
Beta
-0.10
0.05
0.08
0.05
0.10
-0.10
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.20**
0.04
0.26***

1.33
0.06
0.06
0.02

1.58
0.08
0.02*
0.03

2.65**
0.14
0.06***
0.09

Model 4
Beta
-0.08
0.04
0.08
0.05
0.07
-0.08
0.07
0.02
-0.01
0.20**
0.07
0.35***
0.23**
3.27**
0.18
0.04**
0.12

N=210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 4.4
Management Interaction with only Management Stakeholders Included in the Analysis
and Non-Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable
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Further Analyses Utilizing All Stakeholder Groups Simultaneously
After all analyses of the three main stakeholder groups in the family firm were
conducted with both economic and non-economic performance as the dependent variable,
it was necessary to run regression analyses with each of the stakeholder groups
simultaneously. To accomplish this task, the following ten regression models were
created with both economic and non-economic dependent variables and can be seen in
Table 4.12 (economic dependent variable) and Table 4.13 (non-economic dependent
variable). Take note that Model 2 becomes the base model or direct effects model
because all stakes variables are entered here with no salience or interaction terms. The
remaining models provide analysis of each stakeholder group’s salience and interaction
terms entered individually and then simultaneously.
•

Model 1: All control variables

•

Model 2: All control variables and all stakes variables

•

Model 3: All control variables, all stakes variables, and Ownership Salience

•

Model 4: All control variables, all stakes variables, Ownership Salience, and
Ownership Salience/Stakes Interaction variable

•

Model 5: All control variables, all stakes variables, and Family Salience

•

Model 6: All control variables, all stakes variables, Family Salience, and Family
Salience/Stakes Interaction variable

•

Model 7: All control variables, all stakes variables, and Management Salience

•

Model 8: All control variables, all stakes variables, Management Salience, and
Management Salience/Stakes Interaction variable

•

Model 9: All control variables, all stakes variables, and all salience variables
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•

Model 10: All control variables, all stakes variables, all salience variables, and all
interaction variables
Table 4.12 presents results of regression analyses with all variables and economic

performance and may provide further support for H1a, H1c, H2a, H2c, H3a, and H3c.
Model 1 added the control variables to the regression equation, none of the variables
were significant predictors of economic performance, and therefore Model 1 was not
significant. Model 2 added all three stakes variables to the regression equation at the
same time. This addition resulted in a significant change in R2 (0.07; p<0.01). Neither
Ownership Stakes nor Family Stakes had a significant effect. This result does not
provide further support for H1a and is consistent with a lack of confirmation for H2a.
Management Stakes were a significant predictor of economic performance (β = 0.21;
p<0.05), which is counter to H3a that stated the stakes of management would be
negatively related to economic performance but this is consistent with previous tests.
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1.42
0.07
0.07
0.02

2.29**
0.13
0.07**
0.07

0.05
0.05
0.21*

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.03
-0.02

-0.19+
0.00
0.07
0.07
0.11
0.00
-0.02

2.12*
0.13
0.00
0.07

0.05
0.05
0.21*
-0.01

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.03
-0.02

Model 3
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.10

N = 210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Ownership Stakes
Family Stakes
Management Stakes
Ownership Salience
Own. Stakes * Own. Salience
Family Salience
Fam. Stakes * Fam. Salience
Management Salience
Mgt. Stakes * Mgt. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Industry: Ret./Whole./Rest./Hotel
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufact./Constr.

Model 2
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.10

Model 1
Beta
0.11
0.04
-0.09

2.12*
0.13
0.00
0.07

1.99*
0.13
0.00
0.07

0.02
-0.04

0.02

2.41**
0.16
0.03*
0.09

0.05
0.04
0.19*

0.04
0.05
0.21*

0.17+
0.03
0.17*
0.01
0.20*

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.06
0.12
0.04
-0.02

Model 6
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.10

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.03
-0.02

Model 5
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.10

-0.16
-0.02
-0.03
0.07
0.11
0.03
0.00

Model 4
Beta
0.11
0.02
-0.12

2.12*
0.13
0.00
0.07

0.03

0.05
0.05
0.20*

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.02
-0.02

Model 7
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.10

0.10
0.20**
2.53**
0.16
0.03**
0.10

0.01
0.05
0.25**

-0.15
-0.04
0.04
0.07
0.11
0.01
-0.02

Model 8
Beta
0.12
0.02
-0.09

1.86*
0.13
0.00
0.06

0.04

0.04

0.05
0.05
0.20*
-0.05

-0.15
-0.01
0.03
0.07
0.12
0.03
-0.02

Model 9
Beta
0.11
0.03
-0.09

0.12
0.00
0.20*
0.02
0.19*
0.06
-0.10
0.07
0.23*
2.42**
0.20
0.06**
0.12

-0.17
-0.06
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.05
-0.01

Model 10
Beta
0.12
0.01
-0.11

Results of OLS Regression Using Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable and Ownership, Family, and Management
Stakeholders Simultaneously

Table 4.12

Models 3 and 4 introduced Ownership Salience and the Ownership interaction
terms respectively. The models remained significant and in Model 4 there was a
significant change in R2 (0.03; p<0.05). Ownership Stakes were moderately significant
(β = 0.17; p<0.10) and the Interaction term was significant (β = 0.20; p<0.05). This lends
further support for H1a and H1c. A graphical representation of the interaction can be
found in Figure 4.5 below. This graph differs slightly from Figure 4.1 which depicted the
same interaction when no other stakes variables were included in the regression equation.
The relationship between ownership stakes and economic performance had a much less
pronounced positive slope both when ownership salience was low and high. In general
though, this graphical representation is very similar to Figure 4.1

Figure 4.5
Ownership Interaction with All Stakeholders’ Stakes Included in the Analysis and
Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable
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Models 5 and 6 introduced Family Salience and the Family interaction term.
Neither of these variables was significant and there was no significant change in R2. This
was consistent with previous tests.
Models 7 and 8 introduced Management Salience and the Management interaction
terms respectively. The model remained significant (p<0.05), Management Stakes were
significant (Model 7 β = 0.20; p<0.05 & Model 8 β = 0.25; p<0.01), and in Model 8 there
was a significant change in R2 (0.03; p<0.01). This again is consistent with previous tests
and therefore, no support can be found for H3a and H3c. A graphical representation of
the interaction can be found in Figure 4.6 below. Figure 4.6 is nearly identical to Figure
4.2. Therefore, this relationship holds true even when all stakeholder groups are included
in the model.

Figure 4.6
Management Interaction with All Stakeholders’ Stakes Included in the Analysis and
Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable
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Finally, Models 9 and 10 added all salience terms and then all interaction terms.
In Model 10 there was a significant change in R2 (0.06; p<0.01) and this full model was
significant (p<0.01). Management Stakes were significant (β = 0.20; p<0.05), the
Ownership interaction term was significant (β = 0.19; p<0.05), and the Management
interaction term was significant (β = 0.23; p<0.05). Therefore, the full model lends
partial support to H1c. Graphical representations of the interaction terms can be found
below in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. For the ownership stakeholder group, the results of Figure
4.7 show that when ownership salience was low, the relationship between ownership
stakes and economic performance had a slightly negative relationship. When ownership
salience was high, the positive relation was again present. This model was still very
similar to Figures 4.1 and 4.5 and continues to support H1c.

Figure 4.7
Ownership Interaction in the Full Model and Economic Performance as the Dependent
Variable
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Figure 4.8 was similar to previous tests (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.6). The main
difference was that low management salience resulted in slightly higher economic
performance when management stakes were also low. Otherwise, the basic relationships
described previously hold true even when all stakes and all salience variables were
included in the model.

Figure 4.8
Management Interaction in the Full Model and Economic Performance as the Dependent
Variable
Table 4.13 illustrates the relationships of all stakeholder groups with the noneconomic performance of family firms. Model 1 entered the control variables and,
similar to previous tests, the control variable for whether or not the respondent was the
founder of the family business was positive and significant (β = 0.20; p<0.01). The
Founder dummy variable remained significant and in the same direction as in Model 1
throughout all 10 models.
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1.98*
0.12
0.05**
0.06

1.33
0.06
0.06
0.02

2.95***
0.18
0.06***
0.12

Model 3
Beta
-0.08
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.06
-0.07
0.04
-0.01
0.02
0.18*
0.04
0.17*
-0.03
0.27***

N = 210 +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Sales Volume
Age of the Company
Industry: Manufacturing/Const.
Industry: Ret.l/Wholesale/Rest/Hot.
Industry: Personal Services
# of Family FTEs
# of Owners
Percent Family Owned
# of Family potential successors
Dummy: Founder
Ownership Stakes
Family Stakes
Management Stakes
Ownership Salience
Own. Stakes * Own. Salience
Family Salience
Fam. Stakes * Fam. Salience
Management Salience
Mgt. Stakes * Mgt. Salience
F-Value
R square
Change in R Square
Adjusted R Square

Model 2
Beta
-0.07
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.07
-0.12
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.19*
0.10
0.19*
0.01

Model 1
Beta
-0.10
0.05
0.07
0.04
0.11
-0.09
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.20**

2.82***
0.18
0.00
0.12

Model 4
Beta
-0.08
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.05
-0.07
0.04
-0.01
0.03
0.18*
0.09
0.16*
-0.05
0.27***
0.08

3.37***
0.21
0.06***
0.15

0.28***
0.27***

0.23**

2.49**
0.15
0.04**
0.09

Model 6
Beta
-0.07
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.08
-0.08
0.06
0.03
0.00
0.18*
0.01
0.19*
0.02

Model 5
Beta
-0.07
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.07
-0.09
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.18*
0.05
0.14+
-0.04

2.84***
0.17
0.05***
0.11

0.25***

Model 7
Beta
-0.07
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.06
-0.11
0.08
0.02
0.02
0.18*
0.11
0.16*
-0.09

0.33***
0.21**
3.27***
0.20
0.03**
0.14

Model 8
Beta
-0.07
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.04
-0.10
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.18*
0.08
0.16*
-0.04

2.82***
0.19
0.07***
0.12

0.15+

0.04

Model 9
Beta
-0.08
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.06
-0.08
0.05
0.00
0.02
0.18*
0.06
0.15+
-0.08
0.17+

Model 10
Beta
-0.07
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.04
-0.06
0.06
0.00
-0.01
0.18*
0.05
0.17*
-0.01
0.16
0.09
0.14
0.18*
0.14
0.17*
3.32***
0.25
0.06**
0.17

Results of OLS Regression Using Non-Economic Performance as the Dependent Variable and Ownership, Family, and Management
Stakeholders Simultaneously

Table 4.13

Model 2 entered all three stakes variables. The results showed that Family Stakes
had a significant and positive relationship with Family Harmony (β = 0.19; p<0.05).
Ownership Stakes and Management stakes were not significant in Model 2. This
provides no support for H1b or H3b but gives further support for H2b. The significant
relationship between Family Stakes and Family Harmony was at least marginally
significant and positive in the remaining models (3-10).
In Model 3 and Model 4, Ownership Salience and the Ownership interaction term
were added to test H1d. Ownership Salience had a positive and significant relationship
with Family Harmony (β = 0.27; p<0.001) in both models. This relationship was not
previously hypothesized. In Model 4, the Ownership interaction term was not significant.
Therefore, H1b and H1d had no support from this model.
Model 5 and Model 6 tested H2b and H2d and these hypotheses were once again
confirmed. In Model 6, Family Stakes were positive and significant (β = 0.19; p<0.05)
and the interaction of Family Stakes and Family Salience was also positive and
significant (β = 0.27; p<0.001). Thus, family stakes positively affect family harmony,
and when family salience was high the positive relationship between family stakes and
family harmony was magnified. A graphical representation of this relationship can be
seen below in Figure 4.9. This representation is virtually identical to Figure 4.3.
Therefore, the hypothesized positive relationship between family stakes and noneconomic performance at different levels of family salience holds true even when all
stakes variables are included in the model.
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Figure 4.9
Family Interaction with All Stakeholders’ Stakes Included in the Analysis and NonEconomic Performance as the Dependent Variable
Model 7 and Model 8 add Management Salience and the Management interaction
term with the intent of testing H3b and H3d. Both models show that H3d has no support
from the data. It was hypothesized that Management Stakes would have a negative
relationship with Family Harmony and this does not appear to be the case. Indeed,
Management Stakes, Management Salience and the Management interaction term all
provide positive and significant coefficients to the regression equation (β = 0.16; p<0.05
& β = 0.33; p<0.001 & β = 0.21; p<0.01 respectively) in Model 8. The management
stakes and management interaction’s relationships were in the opposite direction
hypothesized in H3b and H3d respectively, and hence have no support from the data
again. A graphical representation of these relationships can be seen below in Figure 4.10.
The graph for Figure 4.10 is very similar to the graph in Figure 4.4. Thus, this
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significant, yet not hypothesized relationship, held true even when all stakes variables
were included in the regression analysis.

Figure 4.10
Management Interaction with All Stakeholders’ Stakes Included in the Analysis and NonEconomic Performance as the Dependent Variable
Lastly, Model 9 adds all salience terms and Model 10 adds all interaction terms.
The intent of the final model was to test all hypotheses concerning non-economic
performance at the same time. In Model 9, the significant salience variables were
Ownership Salience (β = 0.17; p<0.10) and Management Salience (β = 0.15; p<0.10). In
Model 10, the Founder dummy variable was positive and significant (β = 0.18; p<0.05).
Ownership Stakes was not significant, which lends no support to H1b. Family Stakes
was again significant and positive (β = 0.17; p<0.05) which gave further support to H2b.
Management Stakes was not significant and this result gave no support to H3b. Neither
Ownership Salience nor the Ownership interaction variable was significant. This showed
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again that H1d was not supported by the data. The Family interaction variable was
significant and positive (β = 0.18; p<0.05) which demonstrated that the relationships
outlined in H2d remained significant even when all variables were included in the
regression equation. The Management interaction variable remained significant (β =
0.17; p<0.05) and in the opposite direction hypothesized in H3d. Therefore, H3d was not
supported in the full model. Both significant interaction effects can be seen below in
Figures 4.11 and 4.12.
Figure 4.11 was similar to Figures 4.4 and 4.9 and therefore the relationships
described previously concerning the interaction effect of family salience upon the
relationship between family stakes and economic performance held true even when all
stakes and salience variables were included in the regression equation.

Figure 4.11
Family Interaction in the Full Model and Non-Economic Performance as the Dependent
Variable
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Finally, Figure 4.12 shows again that the previous relationships depicted in
Figures 4.4 and 4.10 held true when all variables were included in the regression
equation. Owing to this, the relationship will not be described here again.

Figure 4.12
Management Interaction in the Full Model and Non-Economic Performance as the
Dependent Variable
In summary, when all variables were entered into the regression equation where
non-economic performance was the dependent variable, only H2b and H2d were given
support.
Chapter Summary
Table 4.14 presents a summary of the findings for all hypotheses. The results of
the full model differ slightly in magnitude from the results of the regression analyses run
without all stakeholder groups included but the support, or lack thereof, for the
hypotheses were the same. Four of the twelve hypotheses were supported by these data.
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Table 4.14
Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis Result
H1a
Supported
H1b

Not Supported

H1c

Supported

H1d

Not Supported

H2a

Not Supported

H2b

Supported

H2c

Not Supported

H2d

Supported

Description
The stakes of the ownership stakeholder
group will be positively related to economic
performance.
The stakes of the ownership stakeholder
group will be negatively related to noneconomic performance.
The salience of the ownership stakeholder
group will moderate the relationship
between ownership stakes and economic
performance, where higher ownership
salience will further increase economic
performance.
The salience of the ownership stakeholder
group will moderate the relationship
between ownership stakes and noneconomic performance, where higher
ownership salience will further decrease
non-economic performance.
The stakes of the family stakeholder group
will be negatively related to economic
performance.
The stakes of the family stakeholder group
will be positively related to non-economic
performance.
The salience of the family stakeholder
group will moderate the relationship
between family stakes and economic
performance, where higher family salience
will further decrease economic
performance.
The salience of the family stakeholder
group will moderate the relationship
between family stakes and non-economic
performance, where higher family salience
will further increase non-economic
performance.
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Table 4.14 continued
Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis Result
H3a
Not Supported
H3b

Not Supported

H3c

Not Supported

H3d

Not Supported

Description
The stakes of the management stakeholder
group will be negatively related to
economic performance.
The stakes of the management stakeholder
group will be negatively related to noneconomic performance.
The salience of the management
stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between management stakes
and economic performance, where higher
management salience will further decrease
economic performance.
The salience of the management
stakeholder group will moderate the
relationship between management stakes
and non-economic performance, where
higher management salience will further
decrease non-economic performance.

In conclusion, this chapter described the data collected from family businesses
located in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho in the United States. The chapter provided
results for factor analyses utilized to develop constructs that were later used, along with a
number of control variables, in regression equations to test the relationships set forth by
the conceptual model developed in Chapter II. Further analyses provided a richer
description of the moderating relationships confirmed in the data. The next chapter
presents a discussion of these results and provides study limitations, contributions to the
literature, implications for family business research and practice, and concluding
remarks.
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CHAPTER V
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and present conclusions based upon the
results obtained from empirical testing of the hypotheses. The chapter begins with a
discussion of the research findings. Next, the study’s limitations and contributions to the
literature are presented. This is followed by concluding statements regarding the
implications for research and practice, along with recommendations for future research to
advance the study of family businesses.

Discussion of Results
The purpose of this dissertation was to develop and test a conceptual model where
the primary stakeholder groups in the family firm were shown to have different sets of
stakes that can potentially affect the firm’s economic performance and affect the family’s
non-economic performance. This builds upon the model developed by Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) and later tested by Agle et al. (1999). The newly developed conceptual
model intended to show that the salience of stakeholder groups is not, as suggested by
Mitchell et al. (1997), the primary cause for differences in performance. Instead, the
stakes of the primary stakeholder groups were argued to directly affect performance
while the salience of stakeholder groups serves to only enhance or detract from the
relationship between stakes and performance.
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The model was tested by creating a survey instrument that was subsequently
distributed to a large sample of family businesses in the Pacific Northwest of the United
States. After successfully delineating the proposed constructs through factor analytic
techniques, OLS regression procedures were employed which lead to several key results.
The remainder of this section will describe the implications of both the unsupported and
supported hypothesized relationships. This is then followed by a discussion of significant
results that were not hypothesized.

Hypothesized Relationships: Ownership
The findings for the first set of hypotheses confirmed that there was a positive
relationship between adhering to the stakes of the ownership stakeholder group and the
economic performance of the firm (H1a), and that this relationship was magnified when
the salience of the owner group was higher rather than lower (H1c). It was of no surprise
that the needs of the owners positively affected the economic performance of the firm.
The review of literature clearly demonstrated that the primary stake of the ownership
stakeholder group was the maximization of wealth (e.g., Fiegener, 2005; Fiegener et al.,
2000a, b; Gersick et al., 1997; Olson et al., 2003). It was also argued by Birch (1987)
that founders of firms have a stronger predisposition to pursue economic rather than noneconomic goals. Therefore, these data show that the stakes of the ownership group
tended to affect the firm’s economic performance in a positive, linear manner.
These results support literature concerning agency theory. Agency theorists
typically argue that the greater the level of ownership by those who have the authority to
make decisions, the greater the organization’s performance (e.g., Jensen & Meckling,
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1976). The significant and positive effect of the interaction of ownership stakes and
ownership salience implies that as control or influence over decision making (i.e.,
salience) increases, then the owners will be able to implement actions that meet their
needs which are primarily economic in nature. Thus, owners must not only be in the
position to make decisions, they must also perceive that their claims on the firm take
precedence over other stakeholder groups.
There was no support for H1b and H1d, which stated that ownership stakes are
negatively related to family performance and this relationship is strengthened through the
interaction of ownership stakes and ownership salience. In fact, ownership salience was
a positive rather than a negative predictor of family performance when the ownership
stakeholder group’s effect was tested without the other stakeholder groups in the model
(Table 4.9, p. 107).

Hypothesized Relationships: Family
The results did not confirm that a negative relationship exists between family
stakes and the economic performance of the firm (H2a) and that this relationship is
magnified by higher levels of family salience (H2c). Adhering to the needs and wants of
the family may not be as harmful to economic performance as previously argued. The
effect of diverting funds to family needs rather than the needs of the business may be
offset by the altruistic or steward-like support given to the business by family members
above and beyond that of non-family employees (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). The
family members’ emotional attachment to and identity with the company may increase
their likelihood to work harder when necessary, without receiving immediate benefits but
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all the while knowing that certain perks would be provided through their family
membership (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). Thus the cost of
meeting non-economic claims may be negated by increased family effort without
increased compensation.
This all points to the idea that the alignment of goals (Davis, Schoorman &
Donaldson, 1997) in family firms are not necessary but this is not definitive proof.
Rather it may show that stewardship traits in family firms merely offset the perks of
family membership. Also, owing to the small size of the firms in this sample, in small
family firms the relationship between family stakes and performance may not be
asymmetric enough to where we attain an agency effect and not strong enough to attain a
stewardship effect. Thus, no relationship would be found.
The lack of findings is also in direct contrast with recent research on
entrenchment by Oswald, Muse, and Rutherford (2009) where they found that the
percentage of family ownership of a firm was negatively related to sales growth and
several other financial performance measures. This lack of consistency is likely due to
their operationalization of family influence by using percentage of family ownership as a
proxy, compared to this dissertation’s operationalization of family influence through the
uses of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) salience construct. Percentage of ownership by the family
does not necessarily imply that the family will use their ownership control to meet the
needs of the family whereas the level of salience of the family does accomplish this goal.
Therefore, the authors are possibly not capturing the diversion of funds from economic to
non-economic activities. Instead, they might only be capturing the effects of
entrenchment where the increase in ownership stakes causes conservative decision
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making practices rather than growth-oriented risk taking practices (Wright, Ferris, Sarin
& Awasthi, 1996)
Alternatively, the findings did show that there was a positive relationship between
adhering to the stakes of the family stakeholder group and the non-economic performance
of the firm (H2b). This relationship was magnified when the salience of the family group
was higher rather than lower (H2d). In fact, when family salience was low, varying
levels of stakes made no apparent impact on family harmony. This implies that only
when the family group becomes highly salient will the adherence to family claims be
powerful enough to impact family harmony in a positive manner.
The relationship between family stakes and family harmony makes sense when
the family firm is regarded as a dominant coalition consisting of the same or a small
number of families (Chua et al., 1999). By being the dominant force in the firm, the
family will have operational control of the business in the majority of all situations,
which in turn allows the family to pursue non-economic stakes more easily than when not
in control of the business. Adhering to family member stakes should in effect reduce
conflict amongst the family. Also, as the salience of the family strengthens so too does
the importance of meeting the stakes of the family group. Therefore, the combination of
high family stakes and high family salience implies that family harmony will also be
high.
In short, adhering to family stakes showed no significant relationship with
economic performance but was positively related to non-economic performance.
Previous arguments essentially presented these relationships as a zero sum gain but the
results do not appear to support this assertion.
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Hypothesized Relationships: Management
Finally, the results showed no support for the hypotheses concerning the stakes of
the management stakeholder group. It was argued that the stakes of the management
stakeholder group would negatively affect both economic and non-economic
performance measures in family firms (H3a and H3c) because the needs of the
management stakeholder group were assumed to be counter to the needs of the business
and the family at least in the short term. The basic premise was that increasing adherence
to management claims on the firm would reduce the amount of resources available to
meet the claims of the owners and the family. It was also argued that the salience of the
management stakeholder group would moderate these relationships (H3b and H3d).
The analyses showed that management stakes were not negatively related to the
performance of the business and the family. In fact, management stakes were positively
related to economic performance in Tables 4.8 and 4.12, which is in the opposite
direction as hypothesized in H3a. Also, management salience was positively related to
non-economic performance in Tables 4.11 and 4.13.

Relationships Not Hypothesized but Significant
Several relationships were significant in the data that were not expected. These
relationships were found throughout the multiple regression analyses. Those with
particularly interesting implications are discussed below.
Ownership Salience was a significant predictor of Family Harmony in Table 4.9.
This is an important result because Agle and colleagues (1999) were unable to find
significant relationships between salience constructs and performance variables. This
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relationship implies that as the salience of the ownership group increased so too did the
harmony of the family.
A potential explanation for this result can be found in the sample. The sample
was comprised of relatively small firms (based on sales volume) that were primarily
owned by the family, causing a large overlap in ownership and family roles. This
significant overlap in roles could have adversely affected the results because the salience
or influence of being an owner would allow the family, who are the owners in this case,
to combine ownership and family salience to achieve non-economic, family stakes, and in
turn increase family harmony. In other words, the increased level of salience for owners
would increase the likelihood that family needs would be met because owners and family
are one in the same. This result may provide a better operationalization for arguments of
ownership entrenchment in family firms (Oswald et al., 2009).
A second finding which is particularly interesting is that the hypotheses regarding
management stakeholders were not supported but they were significant. This
significance was in the opposite direction as hypothesized and implies a number of
things.
First, the stakes of the management group, such as salaries and wages that reflect
work input, opportunities for career advancement, and the long-term viability of the
business, positively affect economic performance in these data. This implies that the
returns received from properly incentivized management outweigh their cost in this data
set. In other words, managers who perceive that harder work will result in personal gains
have been incentivized effectively to the point that principle and agent interests are
aligned (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
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Second, it was expected that resources utilized for managerial stakes would
reduce resources necessary to meet the needs of the family and this divergence would
create a source of conflict. The lack of a negative relationship between management
stakes and family performance implies that meeting the needs of management does not
cause conflict amongst family members. This again could be a result of well managed
agency costs that have aligned principle and agent relationships. Also, it could be a
product of firms in the data set having a large portion of family members who are
managers. When an overlap of family and management occurs, the resources received by
management are also received by some family members, which in turn reduces potential
conflict over compensation for managers.
Third, in Table 4.11 and in Table 4.13 Management Salience had a significant and
positive relationship with the performance of the family. This is particularly noteworthy
because Agle and colleagues (1999) were unable to support hypotheses which maintained
that salience variables would have positive linear relationships with performance. This
means that the more importance a decision maker places on a manager when taking
action, the better a family performs. This might imply that giving priority to management
helps mitigate opportunism and conflicts of interest, which in turn allows the family to
focus on their goals.

Limitations
This dissertation contains both theoretical and methodological limitations that
should be addressed. A number of actions were taken to minimize these limitations, but
they may provide scholars with ample opportunities for future research.
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First, the sampling design was cross-sectional in nature. To better attain cause
and effect, a longitudinal research design may have been more appropriate. Providing
data from several points in time would enhance the accuracy and applicability of the
results. Although certain tests were conducted to ensure that the data represented a
reasonable cross-section of family businesses, caution should be taken when inferring
causality from the results.
Second, the use of the construct Family Harmony may not fully capture the
performance of the family. This construct was chosen because the overlapping nature of
the primary stakeholder groups, as described by Gersick et al. (1997), may cause a
heightened level of conflict in family firms. Therefore it was argued that families lacking
conflict are in essence performing well. Even though theoretical reasoning was provided
for the use of the family harmony scale, it may be more appropriate to use a
multidimensional construct or multiple measures that test several different components of
family performance.
Third, the definition of salience implies that decision makers assess the level of
importance of stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997). The priority assigned to each
group affects if or when decisions are made to address each group’s stakes. Therefore,
decision makers were deemed appropriate to test this dissertation’s conceptual model.
However, only a single respondent was surveyed from each family business in the data
and, even though this meets the criterion set forth by salience, it may have been better to
solicit responses from multiple participants at each business. This would reduce the
chance for single source bias in the data. Accomplishing this in the current data set
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would have been difficult owing to the relatively small size of many of the businesses,
which tended to be owner managed.
Fourth, although power analyses resulted in an appropriate sample size to conduct
the study, the size of the final sample is in question due to the effective response rate.
Low response rates can lead to spurious results, which are not reflective of the entire
population (e.g., Kanuk & Berenson, 1975). Several measures were taken to ensure that
non-respondents did not differ from those who completed the survey, but future studies
may want to increase their efforts to obtain a better response.
Fifth, factor analytic techniques were successful in distinguishing between groups
for the creation of the study’s main constructs but a lack of variability in several
measures made this result particularly fortunate. This resulted in rather large correlations
between a number of variables and forced actions to be taken, such as centering variables
and computing z-scores, to mitigate issues with multicollinearity. As researchers
increase the number of stakeholder groups being studied, reduction of multicollinearity
will be more difficult owing to the repetitive nature of asking CEOs to answer questions
about each of these groups. In particular, asking CEOs four items that create salience
scales for each stakeholder group and numerous items concerning stakes scales for each
stakeholder group will make it much more difficult to factor analyze the data as the
number of groups included in an analysis increases.
Finally, the length of the survey made it impossible to include items developed to
capture the three dimensions of salience: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Although it
was argued that previous studies had shown the salience construct to be a fair
representative of its three dimensions, it remains that including those three constructs in
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the family stakeholder salience model could provide richer detail to the relationships
established.
In sum, the theoretical and methodological limitations provide room for
improvement in future studies.

Contributions
This study presents important contributions to the study of stakeholder theory,
family business, and to current family business owners. First, the simultaneous review of
stakeholder and family firm literature brings a deeper understanding of the links between
them. By including family firms in a model of stakeholder salience, this dissertation has
effectively met the call to broaden the scope of stakeholder theory while at the same time
strengthen the understanding of family firm interactions (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008).
The concept of economic and non-economic performance in family firms has
given stakeholder research new ways to test the effect of not only the salience of
particular stakeholder groups, but also to test the actual stakes of which these groups
deem important. The combination of these two literatures has provided valuable insight
concerning the effect of agency relationships upon performance measures in family firms.
By looking at family performance and firm performance simultaneously, this dissertation
sheds light upon the effect of having agents who are members of multiple systems in the
family firm. Thus, this dissertation has satisfied Campbell (1997), Sharma (2004), and
Chrisman and colleagues’ (2005) call to integrate these theories in new ways.
Second, the new conceptual model has greatly enhanced the work of Mitchell et
al. (1997). Their original conceptualization of stakeholder salience laid the groundwork
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for this study but subsequent researchers (Agle et al., 1999) had difficulty empirically
confirming a positive relationship between stakeholder salience and firm performance.
This dissertation answers Agle et al.’s (1999) call to further study this concept. By
hypothesizing an indirect relationship between stakeholder salience and performance
through the stakes of stakeholder groups, this dissertation was able to better explain how
the influence of stakeholder groups affects firms. Thus, by conceptualizing salience to
have an indirect relationship with performance, this dissertation may have provided an
important remedy for Agle et al.’s (1999) lack of significant findings.
Lastly, by including the family stakeholder group and including non-economic
performance, this dissertation further developed knowledge about decision making in
family firms. Not only does it speak to recent research concerning entrenchment (Oswald
et al., 2009), but this dissertation also may relate to the emotional value attached to
ownership of a firm (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008) and how this emotional value affects
the way family business owners make decisions.

Implications
The review of literature and subsequent development of theory, along with the
empirical results and the limitations of this study, provide a number of avenues for future
examination of family businesses and stakeholder theory as well as practical implications
for family business owners.

Research Implications and Future Research
Future research stemming from this study should address the methodological
limitations set forth previously. First, development of sound measures that assess family
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performance is necessary. The lack of multiple measures or measures with multiple
dimensions in the literature points to difficulties in conceptualizing family performance.
Although it was outside the scope of this dissertation, a fully developed assessment of
what truly constitutes family performance would greatly enhance the ability of
researchers to gauge family firm success on several dimensions. Developing new
measures would also provide future researchers with the tools necessary to better test the
relationships in the family stakeholder salience model. Bheer et al.’s (1997) family
harmony construct is simply a first step in this direction. It will be important to build
upon this scale so that future research is better able to capture family performance.
Second, the relationships described in this dissertation may not accurately
describe all family businesses (Gersick et al., 1997). The number of family members and
their governance structure for their firms could drastically change the outcomes of this
study. Other factors may also affect the results. For example, a sample of companies
outside the United States may provide different results owing to a shift in cultural
standards or preferences. Also, larger firms may not possess the exact same properties as
smaller firms. Larger companies, out of necessity, tend to be more professionalized and
possess institutionalized norms or procedures (e.g., Dimaggio & Powell, 1983;
Jepperson, 1991) when making decisions. Therefore, the influence of especially salient
stakeholder groups may not be as strong because institutional norms reduce their power
in the eyes of decision makers. It would be interesting for future research to examine
how the pressures of institutionalized norms of certain industries affect the relationships
tested in this dissertation.
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Third, examining successful decision processes that assist family businesses in
meeting the needs of the three primary stakeholder groups is necessary. How the process
takes place and what tools decision makers use to analyze their situations is particularly
important for the field. Some work in this area has already been done including conflict
management strategies (Sorenson, 1999), succession planning best practices (e.g., Barach
& Ganitsky, 1995; Morris, Williams, Allen & Avila, 1997), general planning practices
(Upton, Teal & Felan, 2002), decisions concerning growth (Ward, 1997), etc. One
potential research question is: If performance is the ultimate goal of both the family and
the business, what processes do successful family businesses use when deciding to meet
the needs of one group over another? Answering questions of this nature will be an
important next step in understanding how family businesses attain success on multiple
levels.
Fourth, research should take into account the potential effect that previous
economic performance has on future family performance. If a family business is not able
to produce enough resources to meet the needs of the business, then it is improbable that
the business will provide enough resources to meet the family’s needs. Consequently, if
resources are provided to the family during times of poor economic performance by the
business, then it may be possible to find a significant, negative relationship between
further poor performance and the family stakeholder group’s stakes. Future research
should consider this effect and may want to include safeguards, such as separating data
into groups based on previous year’s performance and then running analyses to make
sure the relationships between hypothesized variables are not significantly different.
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Fifth, future research may consider integrating recent literature concerning the
management of competing stakeholder claims. Jones, Felps, and Bigley (2007) utilized
characteristics of a company’s corporate culture to categorize how these cultures
managed stakeholder claims. The authors provide various corporate cultures that are
conducive to different ways of managing the trade-offs among competing claims. It
would be interesting if an investigation of a “family culture” were integrated within their
framework.
Finally, future research should address the potential confounds that significant
events in family businesses, such as trans-generational succession planning (e.g.,
Chrisman & Sharma, 1998; Handler, 1994), have on the salience of stakeholders. For
example, during the succession planning process in family firms, does the salience of the
family group play a larger role in the ultimate decision made? Are there key decisions
that will consistently be regarded as those more or less influenced by one stakeholder
group over another? Will institutional norms for top management experience and
legitimacy affect the family’s ability to choose a family member?
In sum, this dissertation offers a host of directions for future researchers to travel.
These implications may provide richer insight about stakeholder effects on various types
of performance in family firms.

Implications for Family Businesses
The current study provides two important implications for the practice of family
firms.
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First, family business owners, decision makers in the firm, and family members
must find effective ways to communicate the numerous goals of both the business and the
family. Since family harmony and economic performance standards appear to be essential
to family businesses, it is necessary to build systematic and professionalized ways of
deciding when and how to meet each stakeholder group’s needs. This is important
because the results of this dissertation show that adherence to stakes can affect multiple
kinds of performance.
Openly discussing the goals of the business and the family could mitigate
potential conflicts as family firms continue to grow. Since a primary goal of a family is
the creation of transgenerational wealth, it will be especially important to strategically
plan for the growth (Poza, 1989; Ward, 1997) necessary to generate enough wealth to
support the family and the business along with future generations of the family.
Open discussion of goals may be especially necessary when family firms are not
performing to their full potential. A lack of resources for the business would most likely
lead to a reduction of resources for the family. This may be especially true when making
choices concerning long-term management of the company, such as succession events. If
a family firm has communicated its intention when developing successors, then not only
will the potential successor be better informed of proper procedures to deal with
significant events that affect both the family and the business, but also non-family
employees will be more informed of the intention of their employers pertaining to
opportunities for advancement and growth of the business.
Unfortunately, planning for growth often does not take place in family firms
(Ward, 1997) and this may be due to a lack of knowledge concerning how to grow. So
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family firm leaders should systematically educate themselves on best practices for growth
and convey this knowledge to the rest of the family in an effort to develop plan of action
that matches both the economic goals of the business and the non-economic goals of the
family.
Second, family business owners need to understand that economic and noneconomic performance of the family appear related on some level. In particular, family
harmony may not have the opportunity to develop when the economic performance of the
family firm is weak. It will be very important for family business owners to know when
certain capital outlays have the potential to generate significant cash flows that may then
be used to meet the needs of the family. When these occasions arise, it will be necessary
to not only take advantage of them, but it will also be necessary to communicate the
potential sacrifices the family will need to make in order for new initiatives to work. In
other words, if families adhere to the suggestion to effectively communicate the intent of
all strategic moves, be it for the betterment of the business or the betterment of the
family, then subsequent capital outlays which benefit one over the other may come with
less conflict between the ownership and the family groups.
In sum, this research encourages family firms to be deliberate in their decisionmaking processes. Numerous stakeholder groups beyond the scope of this dissertation
will be vying for resources. As decision makers better understand stakes and salience of
the three primary stakeholder groups within the family firm, they should find ways to
incorporate standardized processes to handle each group’s demands along with those
arising from conducting their business.
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Conclusion
This chapter provided a discussion of the research results, including relationships
of variables that were not hypothesized. Limitations of the study were addressed along
with contributions to both stakeholder theory and family business research. Additionally,
a number of implications for future research and practical implications for family
business practitioners were provided.
In conclusion, this dissertation studied two research streams under the umbrella of
strategic management and built a new conceptual model to test hypotheses regarding
relationship and resource management in family firms. The theoretical contributions to
multiple literature streams provide not only a sound basis for future projects, but also
give practical insight to those currently operating their own family businesses. The use
of a multi-industry, multi-state data set, which included family businesses of many sizes,
supplied a sufficient basis for studying the hypothesized relationships and the results
showed that the stakes of the primary stakeholders in family firms do in fact affect both
economic and non-economic performance measures.
Family firms have been effectively shown in multiple studies to be the dominant
form of business worldwide. The findings of this dissertation are further indication of
their resilience in the marketplace. The innate ability to manage multiple stakeholder
groups, who have varying effects on dual performance criteria, shows that Gersick and
colleagues (1997) correctly described the inclusion of family businesses in the economy
and the social landscape as “taken for granted.” It is incumbent upon scholars to continue
to nurture the growing field of family business research in order to advance
understanding of such a principal force in our everyday lives.
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Family to Family: Laird Norton Tyee Family Business Survey 2008
Hello, my name is ______, and I am calling from Hebert Research, an independent
research firm based in Bellevue, WA. This call is for research purposes only, and will not
involve sales of any kind. This call also has no connection with any political campaign or
candidate.
Am I speaking with _______________? [NAME OF PERSON ON THE LIST]
[IF NO, ASK FOR THE PERSON, RE-SCHEDULE OR THANK & TERMINATE]
As part of a research project sponsored by Laird Norton Tyee, a seventh generation
family business located in the Pacific NW, we are calling family businesses around the
United States to learn more about them. I am calling to ask you to participate in our
survey. It will take no more than 20 minutes to complete.
Is this a good time for you? [IF NO, ASK FOR THE PERSON, RE-SCHEDULE OR
THANK & TERMINATE]
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have about the study, either now or
later. If you have any questions after completion, please feel free to contact Cynthia
Hebert or Bruce Olsen at (425) 643-1337 or at (800) 869-7035. Your participation is
completely voluntary and you can discontinue any time.
Q1. Are you among the family members who are in charge of the running of the
business?
1. Yes [SKIP TO Q3]
2. No
Q2. [ASK ONLY IF Q1=2] May I speak to someone who is involved in the decisionmaking process of the business?
1. Yes
2. No
[RE-SCHEDULE
OR
THANK
&
TERMINATE]
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Q3. I would like to know who I am speaking to. Are you: [READ ALL; CHECK ALL
THAT APPLY]
1. The founder/owner
2. Co-founder
3. First generation child
4. Second generation child
5. Third generation children
6. Spouse of the owner/founder
7. Sibling of the owner/founder
8. Spouse of the owner/founder
9. Spouse of the owner/founder’s child
10. Other [SPECIFY]

The next set of questions will ask about various characteristics of your company.

Q4. In what year was the business established? [RECORD YEAR]
Q5. How many individuals are owners of the business? [Note to INT: If respondent
works for a Trust, skip Ænot applicable; business is a trust – this is rare and all
are different according to MG – don’t go crazy trying to adjust for this] [Record #]
______# of Owners
Q6. What percentage of the company does the family own? [Record #]
______% Family Owned
Q7. In what year did the family become owners of the business? [RECORD NUMBER]
______Year

Q8. What is the approximate age of the majority share owner of the company?

[RECORD NUMBER]
______Age

Q9. How many total full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) does the business have?
[RECORD NUMBER]
Q10. What changes do you anticipate in the number of full-time equivalent employees in
the next year? Please base your answer on the following categories that I will read to
you:

1.______ Remain the Same
2.______ Increase by 5% or less
3.______ Increase by more than 5%
4.______ Decrease by 5% or less
5.______ Decrease by more than 5%
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Q11. How many family members are employed as full-time equivalent employees (FTEs)
in the business? [RECORD NUMBER]
Q12. If outside work experience is required for family members to work in the business,
how many YEARS are required?

______# of years
______Don’t Know
______Not required
Q13. When does the current CEO plan to retire? [RECORD NUMBER OF YEARS]

Q14. On a scale from 0-10, where 10 is “Very likely” and 0 is “Not likely at all” how
likely do you think that the next CEO/Partner or someone in a similar leadership position
would be a family member? [RECORD NUMBER]
Q15. On a scale from 0-10, where 10 is “a lot of time” and 0 is “no time at all”, how
much succession planning have you engaged in? [RECORD NUMBER]
Q16. How many potential successors are available from the controlling family?
[RECORD NUMBER]
Q17. Have your senior generation shareholders written and signed estate plans (other
than wills)?

1.______Yes
2.______No
Q18. What type of board does the business have? Please base your answer on the
following categories that I will read to you:

1.______ Board of Directors
2.______ Advisory Board
3.______ Both
4.______ No board exists (If no board, skip to Q21)
Q19. Is the legal board made up of family members or non-family members? Please
base your answer on the following categories that I will read to you:

1.______Family only
2.______Mix of family and non-family members
3.______Non-Family only
4.______Not Applicable
Q20. On a scale from 0-10, where 10 is “highly agree” and 0 is “not agree at all,” please
indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: A. “The legal board of
directors makes a valuable contribution to the direction of the business.” [RECORD #]

Q21. What was the average sales growth percentage of your firm over the last 3 years?
[Note to INT: If respondent answers 2005 to 2007 in question 7 then use the
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following question: What was the average sales growth percentage of your firm
since your family began ownership?]

______ Average Sales Growth Percentage
Q22. What was the approximate average after-tax profit as a percentage of sales for
your firm over the last 3 years? [Note to INT: If respondent answers 2005 to 2007 in
question 7 then use the following question: What was the approximate average
before-tax profit as a percentage of sales for your firm since the family began
ownership?] [RECORD NUMBER]

Q23. This next section of questions will focus on your perception of business and family
issues. Rate the following statements on a scale from 0-10 where 0 is “Strongly
disagree” and 10 is “Strongly agree.” [RECORD NUMBER AFTER EACH]
A. “Relative to our major competitors, our firm has VERY high sales growth.”
B. “Relative to our major competitors, our firm is VERY profitable.”
C. “I have a high level of confidence in the growth of the business in the next 5
years.”

D. “Our family business has DISTINCT processes for making decisions about
ownership, management and family issues.”
E. “The family members who control the business seem to get along with each
other better than most families do.”
F. “People in the controlling family agree with each other on most issues.”
G. “People in the controlling family are VERY compatible with each other.”
H. “The controlling family members almost NEVER argue with each other.”

Q24. In this next section, I will read a set of statements. Please base your answers
ONLY on your PERCEPTION as a member of the top management team concerning the
importance of the wishes of OWNERS. Rate each statement on a scale from 0-10; “0”
being Strongly Disagree and “10” being Strongly Agree. [RECORD NUMBER AFTER

EACH STATEMENT]
A. The wishes of the owners receive HIGH priority from our top management
team.
B. “The needs of the owners receive a HIGH degree of time and attention from
our top management team.”
C. “Satisfying the claims of the owners is very important to our top management
team.”
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D. “The goals of the owners influence the decision making processes of our top
management team.”
E. “The long term financial success of the business is very important to the
owners of the company.”
F. “Having a highly profitable business is very important to the owners of the
company.”
G. “Maintaining ownership control of the business is very important to the owners
of the company.”
H. “The long-term growth of the business is very important to the owners of the
company.”
I. “A high return on investment is very important to the owners of the company.”
Q25. In this next section, I will read a set of statements. Please base your answers
ONLY on your PERCEPTION as a member of the top management team concerning the
importance of the wishes of FAMILY MEMBERS. Rate each statement on a scale from 0
to 10; “0” being Strongly Disagree and “10” being Strongly Agree. The first statement is:
A. “The wishes of the family members receive HIGH priority from our top
management team.”
B. The needs of the family members receive a HIGH degree of time and attention
from our top management team.”
C. “Satisfying the claims of the family members is very important to our top
management team.”
D. “The goals of the family members influence the decision making processes of
our top management team.”
E. “Providing employment for family members is very important to the family.”
F. “Maintaining the reputation of the family members in the community is very
important to the family.”
G. “Providing financial security to individual family members is very important to
the family.”
H. “Continued family member involvement in the management of the business is
very important to the family.”
I. “Having a highly profitable business is very important to the family.”
Q26. In this next section, I will read a set of statements. Please base your answers
ONLY on your PERCEPTION as a member of the top management team concerning the
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importance of the wishes of MANAGEMENT. Rate each statement on a scale from 0 to
10; “0” being Strongly Disagree and “10” being Strongly Agree. The first statement is:
A. “The wishes of individual managers receive HIGH priority from our top
management team.”
B. “The needs of the managers of the firm receive a HIGH degree of time and
attention from our top management team.”
C. “Satisfying the claims of the individual managers is very important to our top
management team.”
D. “The individual goals of the managers influence the decision making
processes of our top management team.”
E. “A good work environment is very important to the managers of the firm.”
F. “A competitive salary and benefits package is very important to the managers
of the firm.”
G. “An opportunity for career advancement is very important to the individual
managers of the firm.”
H. “Ensuring that those who CONTRIBUTE to firm profit are compensated
accordingly is very important to the individual managers of the firm.”
I. “The long-term growth of the business is very important to the individual
managers of the firm.”
Q27. In this next section, I will read a set of statements. As member of Top Management
Team of your firm, rate each statement on a 0-10 scale, with 0 being “Strongly
Disagree” and 10 being “Strongly Agree.” RECORD NUMBER AFTER EACH]
A. “Family conflicts do not influence business operations or decisions.”
B. “I believe that the business will be controlled by the same family(ies) in five
years.”
OK, to conclude we have just a couple of questions about you.
Q28. Excluding personal real estate, what percentage of your personal net worth is the
family business? I will read you the following categories to base your answers on:

-------% of net worth
Q29. What is your highest educational level? Please base your answer on the following
categories that I will read to you: [INT: Please check only one option]
1.____Less than high school

2.____High school graduate
3.____Some college
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4. ____College graduate[ASK THE NAME OF THE DEGREE. E.g. MBA,
Accounting, Finance, etc.]
5.____Post-graduate degree[ASK THE NAME OF THE DEGREE. E.g. MBA,
Accounting, Finance, etc.]
Q30. In what year were you born in? [RECORD YEAR]

______Year
Thank you for your time today and we appreciate your feedback in helping
improve our knowledge and understanding of family businesses.
[INT: DON’T ASK – record gender based on voice]

1. Male
2. Female
[PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTION: RECORD ZIP & INDUSTRY OF
COMPANY]
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